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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics,
case studies, research papers, articles, and books.
It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First,
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War
College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct
any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the
content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all
CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety
of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as
ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The
point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the
challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real
people faced in high-pressure situations.
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Donald R. Hamilton served as counselor for public affairs at the U.S.
Embassy in El Salvador from May of 1982 through June of 1986—longer
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Service career, Hamilton also served in Tel Aviv, Lima (twice), Caracas,
the Sinai Field Mission, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. In
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I. Introduction
Through the 1980s, the United States involved itself in a civil war1
in the smallest country on the mainland of the Americas. With a
population roughly the equivalent of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area and no clear geo-strategic benefit, El Salvador became an issue of
constant concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government. U.S.
President Ronald Reagan made televised addresses about El Salvador and
spoke to a joint session of Congress about assistance to the tiny country.
For a few years, only Israel and Egypt received more assistance.
However, even with El Salvador prominent in the top tier of U.S.
foreign policy concerns, a war going on there, and the United States
committed to one side, we never had more than about 200 military
personnel in that country on any given day. While the U.S. could have
brought overwhelming force to bear, we put few boots on the ground. The
U.S. military was nonetheless an indispensable element of U.S. policy.
The other part of the story is that the Salvadoran government was
dependent on the performance of a military that was profoundly flawed—
murderous, corrupt, and attached to its historical impunity.
Although the Salvadoran conflict was a creation of the Cold War,
it is not a historical oddity. Before and since, the United States has
committed itself to a flawed ally. From Stalin through Diem and right on
through to Karzai, our political leadership has repeatedly declared that one
government or one cause is so important that we must find a way reform
or tolerate or ignore the flaws of our friends. This is not always a bad thing.
Winston Churchill was known for his staunch anti-Soviet views but
offered assistance to Stalin’s government when Hitler invaded the Soviet
Union. Asked about this seeming inconsistency, Churchill is said to have
1

Neither the Government of El Salvador nor the United States referred to the conflict as a
“civil war.” The Salvadorans did not wish to extend combatant status to the insurgents,
and the U.S. has never described itself as participating in anyone else’s civil war.
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responded, “If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable
reference to the devil in the House of Commons.”
Nor was it the first time that the United States, with no apparent
reason, declared a country or piece of territory of great value to national
security. Consider Quemoy and Matsu. Given the age of serving military
personnel, none of you may remember, but some of you may have read
about it in a Cold War history or a study of the Kennedy-Nixon
presidential race.2 When these conflicts are reviewed in subsequent
decades, they can seem silly and wrong-headed.
But while these incidents unfold, factors invisible in later years
loom large. Few are possessed of the ability to understand the way the
world will look in 40 years. Our national leaders are not specially blessed
with foresight. Indeed, temporary political exigencies can narrow any
politician’s viewpoint. One example may suffice. Lyndon Johnson
mastered partisan politics and had a powerful sense of justice on racial
matters.3 Additionally, he foresaw terrible problems in Vietnam. But he
also saw that the Republicans would make problems for him if he pulled
out.4 We know which fear prevailed.
Please note: The viewpoint throughout this study is largely that of
the U.S. executive branch.5 The viewpoints, aims, and ambitions of other
2

These tiny islands in the Strait of Taiwan were heavily fortified by the Nationalist
Chinese government in Taiwan, but were within artillery range of the People’s Republic
of China. During the 1960 presidential race, Nixon accused Kennedy of being unwilling
to commit to the use of nuclear weapons if Quemoy and Matsu were invaded by the
People’s Republic of China.
3
He predicted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would drive the South into Republican
hands.
4
See “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell,
Washington, May 27, 1964, 10:55 p.m.,” U.S., Department of State, Office of the
Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland
Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 52.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/lbjrr.htm
5
Readers may rest assured the author knows that he hasn’t the moral or intellectual
authority to speak for America. Even so, he will try to capture the main currents of
thought at the time.
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branches of government as well as those of other countries and
organizations are referred to and assumed, but always from the viewpoint
of the U.S. This is unavoidable, but if properly stated and understood, of
value. Any use of whatever lessons may be taken from this study will all
but certainly be undertaken in the same context.

Discussion Questions
1. Can the U.S. military carry out an extended mission if a vocal
minority of the American people oppose it, a quieter minority
supports it, and most Americans are indifferent to or unaware of it?
2. Can our military prevail when its advantages in technology,
maneuverability, firepower, communications, and mobility are
irrelevant?
3. What is the role of a warrior who is forbidden to engage in, or even
go near, combat?
4. How does “civilian control of the military” play out when the
civilian controlling the military (the U.S. ambassador) is not in the
White House, but in the same building?
5. How do you, both as an individual and as part of a military
organization, work with counterparts who are not just flawed, but
criminal?
6. How candid can you be, should you be, must you be in
communicating matters to other agencies, the media, the public,
that do not reflect public policy expressions from the highest
levels? What about communicating facts that contradict official
assertions? How can someone on the ground voice dissent?

9
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II. A Moment in Time
In 1976, Manuel Rodriguez, chief of staff of the Salvadoran Army,
made a deal to sell $30 million in American-supplied arms and aircraft to
two individuals he thought were members of the American Mafia. The two
“buyers” were cops. Rodriguez was convicted and sentenced to five years
in prison—even though the military high command in El Salvador (with
the overwhelming approval of the entire officer corps) spent over
$100,000 on his legal expenses.6
Not long after taking office in January 1977, the Carter
administration, citing egregious human rights abuses, ended military
assistance to El Salvador.
Four years later, with Rodriguez out of prison and back in El
Salvador, the Carter administration resumed military assistance.
What happened?
In spite of El Salvador’s proximity7 to the United States, the U.S.
had never taken much interest in the country. With only one coast, El
Salvador could not be the site of an interoceanic canal. There was no oil or
other extractable mineral. No United Fruit8 stood astride the economy. The
coffee industry is globally disbursed and has never been vertically
integrated, so El Salvador’s largest crop was never owned or dominated by
foreign companies. Historically, El Salvador was not an outward-looking
country in any but a commercial sense. Even when Farabundo Martí led
the Western Hemisphere’s first avowedly communist uprising in 1932,9
the broader world paid scant attention.
Information about the officer corps’ support of official funds for Rodriguez’s defense
told to the author by (then) Lt. Col. Carlos Avilés at a social function in 1984.
7
As President Reagan often said, San Salvador (the capital) is closer to Houston than
Houston is to Washington.
8
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Fruit_Company.
9
Agustín Farabundo Martí, once an assistant to Nicaragua’s Augusto Cesár Sandino, was
a founder of the Communist Party of Central America and a leader in the uprising against
Salvadoran dictator Maxmiliano Hernández Martinez. The uprising was crushed with
6
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At the beginning of the Carter administration (1977-1981): the
United States had so little interest in El Salvador that, according to press
accounts, the Central Intelligence Agency closed its station there and
consolidated it into a regional one based elsewhere.
The sudden and surprising collapse of the Somoza regime in
neighboring (but not quite contiguous) Nicaragua changed that. For three
generations, the Somoza family had run Nicaragua as a dictatorship happy
to demonstrate its fealty to the United States.10 Following a brief armed
rebellion, the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew Anastasio
Somoza Debayle’s regime on July 19, 1979. The “Sandinista” part of the
name came from Augusto Sandino, who had rebelled against a U.S.
occupation of Nicaragua in 1927. Although the Carter administration tried
hard to reach an amicable relationship with the new Sandinista
government, it was always swimming upstream. The Sandinista anthem
contained a line about the “Yankee enemies of humanity.”
The Sandinista victory caused many to believe El Salvador would
soon fall to the existing leftist insurgency—one closely tied to the
Sandinistas. The abrupt collapse of the Somoza regime surprised left as
well as right. In mid-1978, many thought the insurgency in El Salvador
stronger than the Sandinistas. They were almost certainly richer. By 1978,
the FMLN had accumulated a war chest of some $80 million. That made
them rich enough to invest $10 million in the Nicaraguan revolution. They
gave the money to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica—in cash.11
On September 15, 1979, the Carter administration sent Assistant
Secretary of State Viron P. Vaky to El Salvador to encourage Salvadoran
about 30,000 people slaughtered. Hernandez had Martí shot after a perfunctory hearing.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabundo_Mart%C3%AD.
10
Franklin Roosevelt is supposed to have said of Somoza, “He may be a son-of-a-bitch,
but he is our son-of-a-bitch.” The story may well be invented. He is supposed to have
said the same thing of Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo. True or not, the quote
endures because it seems to encapsulate U.S. attitudes toward Latin American dictators.
11
James LeMoyne, “The Guerilla Network,” New York Times Magazine, April 6, 1986,
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/06/magazine/the-guerrilla-network.html.
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President Carlos Humberto Romero to call early elections as a means of
preempting the insurgents. Romero refused. Everyone might have been
better off had he followed the path Vaky suggested.
A month later, on October 15, reformist military officers overthrew
President Romero in a bloodless coup.12 They set up a military-civilian
junta, the Revolucionario de Gobierno (Revolutionary Government Junta,
or JRG). Reformist intentions notwithstanding, the various insurgent
groups were not mollified and continued their fight. A disparate group of
landowners, bankers, industrialists, and many military officers in El
Salvador were furious. They believed the Carter administration, working
with the JRG, was prepared to do to El Salvador exactly what they had
done to Somoza’s Nicaragua—abandon it to the communists.
While these events constitute the launching pad for a major
conflict in El Salvador and all of Central America, it is not possible to
comprehend U.S. involvement outside the context of world events and U.S.
politics and U.S. public opinion. Ten years before or after, events in El
Salvador and Nicaragua would almost certainly have brought a very
different response from any U.S. administration.
In the United States, the national mood was sour. At one point
President Jimmy Carter gave what came to be called the “malaise
speech.”13 The Boston Globe prepared an editorial about the speech with a
title along the lines of “Let Us All Pull Together.” Someone at the Globe
inserted a new headline: “Mush from the Wimp.” A swath of the
population was delighted with the headline. How did our national mood
become so sour? Consider the approximately five years that ended the
1970s:

12

Some have wondered if the U.S. engineered the October 1979 coup. In a sense, it did
not matter if the U.S. reached out to the golpistas (Spanish for “coup makers”). The fact
of the Vaky visit and knowledge of his message would have been understood as a
message: “The U.S. is through with Romero and with 50 years of military presidents.”
13
He never used the word “malaise.”
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President Richard M. Nixon had resigned when it became clear
that he would be convicted of “high crimes and misdemeanors” if
he tried to remain in office.
We left Vietnam in defeat, panic, and disorder. When our
ambassador helicoptered off the U.S. embassy roof with our flag
under his arm, he left behind untold thousands of Vietnamese who
had trusted us. A few lucky Vietnamese loaded their helicopters
with their families and flew offshore to U.S. carriers. The carriers
had no place to put the helicopters, so carrier crews pushed the
helicopters into the sea. It made for gripping television. Others
crowded on to boats and barges and hoped for refuge.
Oil shocks in 1972 and again in 1979 had run energy prices
through the roof. Lining up for gasoline shocked Americans. As an
energy-saving measure, the lights on the Capitol Dome and
Washington Monument were turned off late at night.
Following peaceful negotiations, the United States negotiated and
signed a treaty that would eventually turn “our canal” over to
Panama.
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who described the United States as the
“Great Satan,” led mobs that toppled our friend, the Shah. “Student”
supporters overran the U.S. embassy in Teheran and held our
diplomats hostage.14
Just 17 days after our embassy in Teheran was seized, a mob in
Islamabad burned our embassy there to the ground and killed a
Marine Security Guard and an Army warrant officer.15

14

In 1980, a bollixed military rescue ended in blood and flames in the desert. Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest at President Carter’s decision to launch the rescue.
Vance stayed in office to avoid hinting that something was afoot, but he was careful to
make it clear at the time that he would leave regardless of the outcome. His view, roughly
stated, was that this was such a bad idea that it did not matter if it succeeded.
15
The proximate cause of the rioting (to which the Pakistani authorities seemed to be
deliberately slow to respond) was the violent occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca.
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Anti-government forces kidnapped the U.S. ambassador in Kabul,
Adolf “Spike” Dubs. At the direction of Soviet advisers and over
U.S. objections, the Afghan government launched an assault that
killed Ambassador Dubs.
The Soviets launched a full-scale invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan.
In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas threw out the thuggish but pro-U.S.
Somoza family. The Sandinistas were cozy with Havana.
The prime rate was about 15%; the “misery index” (unemployment
rate plus inflation rate) was over 20%.

The United States had emerged from World War II as the richest,
most powerful, and most respected nation in history. How had we come to
this in one lifetime?
It is commonplace to attribute President Carter’s 1980 electoral
loss to the Iran hostage crisis. But the broader sense that many things had
gone terribly wrong came well before and then ran parallel to the hostage
crisis. The Carter administration had always faced an uphill battle. By the
1970s, the states west of the Mississippi were enough by themselves to
win in the Electoral College. In 1976, Gerald Ford carried every state west
of the Mississippi except Texas and California.
In light of national and international events, there was no reason to
assume any state that went for Ford would vote for Carter. Nor did anyone
believe Carter could keep Texas and California out of the hands of Ronald
Reagan.
Running on a time-for-a-change platform, Ronald Reagan’s
overwhelming victory gave him a mandate for a frankly assertive foreign
policy, a policy that turned out to be not so much aggressive as defiant.
The rumor sweeping through Pakistan was that the occupation was the work of the
Israelis. Ironically, the Muslim extremists who took over the mosque evolved into al
Qaida.

14
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Central America was close to home and there was little doubt of
communist involvement. The prospect of something like another Cuba
close to our borders was a logical place to show this defiance.
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III. The Carter Administration
Before the 1979 coup, the Carter administration had cut off all
military assistance to El Salvador16 because of human rights abuses. But
with the coming of land reform17 in March of 1980 and the advent of a
second, completely civilian, junta,18 the U.S. began a $6 million program
of military assistance.
As these events occurred, Salvador exploded into civil war. The
insurgency never stopped and its support from Cuba, overwhelmingly
moving through Nicaragua after mid-1979, continued. Many of those
whose land had been confiscated for agrarian reform (commonly called los
afectados—the “affected ones”) became death squad supporters. Some
gave only emotional support, sympathy, or tolerance; other afectados gave
direction, money, and political and public relations support. The rightwing opponents of the junta coalesced around Roberto D’Aubuisson, a
former major in the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Short and slender,
D’Aubuisson nevertheless brought a vibrant (and violent) speaking style
and considerable charisma to the conservative cause.
As the guerrillas pursued more-or-less common urban guerrilla
tactics such as kidnappings for ransom, robberies, Molotov cocktail
attacks, and selective assassinations, the right responded with death
squads.19

16

As well as Guatemala and Argentina.
Designed in great part with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the AFL-CIO’s Latin American arm, the American Institute of Free
Labor Development (AIFLD).
18
The first mixed civilian and military junta collapsed with the resignation of all its
civilian members. All civilian cabinet members also resigned.
19
“Death squad” is an elusive term, but usually refers to police or soldiers committing
murders while operating with no lawful authority or acknowledged chain of command. In
El Salvador, most death squads consisted of soldiers or police operating under the
instructions of their officers. The officers may or may not have received instructions from
their legitimate chain of command. Selected officers may have been responding to
17
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This put the Carter administration in a bad place.
After having attempted to move Somoza out using “interference
without intervention,”20 the administration tried to propitiate the
Sandinistas. They gave an immediate $15 million grant for reconstruction
and pushed another $75 million through Congress. In September 1979, the
president invited the nine-member Sandinista directorate to the White
House. This pattern of embracing almost any group that replaces a tyranny
is a recurrent theme for the U.S. Iraq, Egypt, and Libya come immediately
to mind. Fear of doing this again is a major factor in our delicacy in the
continuing21 Syrian civil war.
Through 1979 and into 1980, relations with the Sandinistas
deteriorated. In El Salvador, chaos and bloodshed accelerated.
The Salvadoran Catholic Church became prominent in the war and
remained so throughout. In February 1980, Salvadoran Archbishop Óscar
Romero wrote to President Carter and asked that the president not increase
military aid to the Salvadoran junta. Romero said such aid would
“undoubtedly sharpen the injustice and the political repression inflicted on
the organized people, whose struggle has often been for their most basic
human rights.”
On March 23, 1980, the Archbishop’s sermon included a call to
Salvadoran soldiers:
I want to make a special appeal to soldiers, National Guardsmen,
and policemen: each of you is one of us. The peasants you kill are
your own brothers and sisters. When you hear a man telling you
to kill, remember God’s words, “thou shalt not kill.” No soldier is
obliged to obey a law contrary to the law of God. In the name of
instructions from former military personnel or wealthy patrons from as far away as
Miami.
20
That is the description applied by Mauricio Solaún, President Carter’s final ambassador
to Nicaragua, in a conversation with the author in San Salvador in 1986.
21
As of spring 2014.
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God, in the name of our tormented people, I beseech you, I
implore you; in the name of God I command you to stop the
repression.22
Archbishop Romero was assassinated the next day while saying
mass in a hospital chapel, slain by a single rifle shot. D’Aubuisson was
immediately and widely considered to be responsible for his murder.23 The
Archbishop’s funeral drew a huge crowd, but it was broken up when
government forces fired automatic weapons into the mourners.24 Video of
the panicked crowd made an important impression in the U.S.
By May 1980, the disparate bands of armed groups confronting the
Salvadoran government came together after Fidel Castro brought them to
Havana and insisted they unite. They became the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate, but the only thing that really mattered was their military
organization, Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front): invariably shortened in English and
Spanish to FMLN.
That same month D’Aubuisson was arrested and momentarily
jailed in San Salvador. Perhaps to 300 demonstrators blaming the U.S. for
the arrest blockaded the residence of U.S. Ambassador Robert White.
They shouted slogans and waved placards such as “Down with Human
Rights!” “Long Live Reagan!” “Carter is a Commie!” and “White is Red!”
Eventually, the embassy’s Marine Security Guards dispersed the

Romero, Archbishop Oscar, “The Last Sermon,”
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/faculty/amcguire/romero.html
23
The UN Truth Commission for El Salvador later substantiated this, finding that “Major
Roberto D’Aubuisson gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop.” See “D. Death
Squad Assassinations,” Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador, English p.
127, March 15, 1993, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
24
The Salvadoran Armed Forces said the armed left killed the demonstrators/mourners.
The consensus among responsible analysts is that the FMLN set off some leaflet bombs
or other demonstration explosions. After the explosions, the government forces opened
fire.
22
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demonstrators with tear gas grenades so the ambassador could go to the
embassy. Death squad killings continued to grow before reaching a
monthly toll of 750 in October 1980.25
Rightist opposition to the (second) junta and U.S. involvement was
strong and growing stronger throughout this period. The leftist opposition
also opposed the junta and U.S. involvement. The U.S. Embassy in San
Salvador was machine-gunned, rocketed, or otherwise attacked about 20
times in 1980. Only one of the attacks on the embassy had the potential for
major casualties: One afternoon, an RPG came through the window next
to the ambassador’s office. Although one must suppose the ambassador
was the intended target (he was not in the embassy): the rocket actually
penetrated the ambassador’s conference room where the country team met
several times weekly. The ambassador’s conference room was moved to
the basement, but his office stayed on the third floor. None of the attackers
was definitively identified individually or by organization.
These attacks on the embassy and the picketing at the
ambassador’s residence are noteworthy only for their frequency and
presumed rightist origin. Throughout the Cold War and especially after the
U.S. entered Vietnam in force, U.S. embassies were common targets for
demonstrations, vandalism, and occasional violent attacks. While
American diplomats, especially ambassadors, were and are frequent
targets of terrorists, massive violence intended to kill large numbers of
people at American embassies really did not start until the bombing of the
U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983.26
The count of death squad victims was neither accurate nor official. The U.S. embassy’s
human rights office attempted to compile numbers based on press reports but freely
acknowledged the defects of its own system. Most of the “death squad victims” were
merely described as having been “found dead.” The embassy noted that the method all
but certainly undercounted deaths in rural areas and also recorded deaths from ordinary
criminality as “death squad killings.”
26
“Terrorism” has defied definition in international forums. One of the few and one of
the first agreed-upon was that attacks on embassy personnel are terrorism because they
are “internationally protected persons.” While the United Nations has never achieved a
25
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In this context, neither the American people nor their government
became alarmed about the attacks on the embassy. The State Department
sent dependents home and made San Salvador an unaccompanied tour for
personnel of all agencies. Diplomatic Security changed the iron-barred
fence to a concrete wall and placed sandbags and armor plates around and
partially covering the windows. Diplomatic Security also instituted
aggressive, roving armed patrols around the embassy. Anyone
photographing the embassy or loitering was braced and asked to identify
himself. Journalists with ID were permitted to photograph, but were asked
to call ahead in the future.
Examining the options:
 Did the Carter administration handle the deteriorating security
situation properly?
 What were other options were available?
 Why not just walk away? Some countries, including the Israelis
and the Japanese, closed their embassies, wished the Salvadoran
government well, and went home.
 Alternately, instead of adding a small number of Marine Security
Guards, why not bring in several dozen to show resolve?

broad definition of terrorism, UN diplomats quickly reached agreement that attacks on
diplomats were forbidden “under all circumstances.” Terrorism itself has changed
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The State Department’s annual publication
“Patterns of Global Terrorism” (now called “Country Reports on Terrorism”) always
showed that the greatest number of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests took place in Latin
America—but these attacks seldom caused casualties. Indeed, until the 1990s, most
terrorist incidents were property crimes such as small bombs placed outside empty
buildings. Most of the time, the purpose was to attract attention, to create “propaganda by
the deed.” At the end of the 1990s, the number of terrorist attacks was down dramatically
but the death count was going up. With the rise of mass-casualty terrorism and
devastating attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi and on the UN
compound in Iraq, petty attacks and vandalism against embassies seems to have
diminished.

20
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What should the U.S. do today when an administration sends an
embassy to a very dangerous place with no U.S. combat forces in
country?27

27

It happens more often than you think. Since 1945, more American ambassadors than
American generals have been killed by hostile action.
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IV. The Interregnum
No one familiar with El Salvador was surprised that Salvadoran
conservatives preferred Ronald Reagan in the 1980 U.S. elections.
Virtually all well-to-do Salvadorans believed that the troubles afflicting
their country should be charged to Jimmy Carter’s account. Even so,
American diplomats who had been abroad during many U.S. elections did
not expect the extensive celebratory gunfire in San Salvador’s better
neighborhoods when it became clear that Reagan had won.
That gunfire signaled a changed dynamic in El Salvador. Those
actively opposing the rebels had feared the Carter administration would
leave them to the mercy of the communists. Now they were confident that
a Reagan administration would set aside the Carter human rights policy,
which they believed prevented progress against the communists. Reagan,
they said and believed, would get down to the serious business of stopping
communist aggression. Left and right in El Salvador shared one belief: A
Reagan administration would stand against the rebels—no matter what.
Death squad killings dropped quickly and never returned to the
October 1980 level. But if the number of systematic murders fell, the
victims’ profile soared. Between the election and the inauguration of
Ronald Reagan, the following events occurred:


As soon as it became clear that Reagan would win, Americans
claiming to have influence with the new administration began
visiting El Salvador. They met with prominent members of the
business community, right-wing politicians, and others unknown.
These self-proclaimed envoys of the incoming administration
promised big changes in U.S. policy, including a house cleaning at
the Department of State and the immediate departure of
Ambassador White. People serving at the embassy at the time do
not recall any of these individuals securing positions in the Reagan
administration, but some already were or became staffers on
22
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Capitol Hill. Several people assigned to the embassy at the time
told the author that the visitors’ Salvadoran contacts came to
believe that the Reagan administration would be uninterested in
human rights and that the administration would not be curious
about how the left was to be defeated.
On November 28, “heavily armed men dressed in civilian
clothes”28 kidnapped six leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (generally known by its Spanish initials FDR) from a
meeting in San Salvador. The FDR was an organization of
socialists who believed in democracy and had not taken up arms.
They were tortured and murdered the same day, and their bodies
were dumped in the streets of the capital.
On December 2, two American nuns who were resident in El
Salvador but visiting Managua returned to attend a memorial
service for the FDR leaders. Another American nun and a female
American lay worker went to the airport to pick them up. Shortly
after they left the airport, all four were intercepted by a group of
Salvadoran National Guardsmen. The Guardsmen murdered them
all and burned their van. The Guardsmen probably raped them as
well, but the forensic tests necessary to prove this were never run.
On December 28, American freelance journalist John J. Sullivan
arrived in El Salvador and checked into the Sheraton Hotel. About
two hours later, he went out for a walk and disappeared. Foul play
was assumed from the start, but his body was not discovered for
some 18 months. The New York-based Committee to Protect
Journalists later received highly credible and specific information
that the Treasury Police had picked Sullivan up off the street,
tortured, and murdered him. They chopped off his hands and put a

The phrase “heavily armed men dressed in civilian clothes” was a euphemism that
Salvadoran newspapers and radio used at the time. It really meant “military personnel not
in uniform.”
28
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grenade in his mouth to make identification difficult. It seems the
Treasury Police had mistaken Sullivan for a rebel collaborator to
whom he bore a slight resemblance.29
On January 3, 1981, two Salvadoran National Guardsmen,
operating on orders and under threat, murdered Michael Hammer
and Mark Pearlman, two Americans working for the American
Institute of Free Labor Development. They also murdered Rodolfo
Viera, the head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute. The
victims were just finishing dinner in the Sheraton Hotel when the
Guardsmen opened fire with Ingram machine pistols. The
commanders of the Guardsmen and prominent civilian friends of
the officers were present at the hotel at the time.30
On January 5, a respected Salvadoran lawyer, well and favorably
known to the U.S. Embassy, told Chargé d’ Affaires, a.i.31 Mark
Dion that a gang of six Salvadorans living in Miami were behind
most death squad activity. As Dion reported in a NODIS cable,32
these six men had bribed military and government officials in El

This author worked closely with the Committee to Protect’s executive director Anne
Nelson when she came to San Salvador in an effort to meet the unnamed author of the
letter containing this information. Ms. Nelson and I both thought the letter was authentic,
or was at least written by someone who had access to accurate information. The letter
described Sullivan very well and stated the approximate amount of money he was
carrying, as well as the brand of his camera. I worked with Nelson and the Embassy
Regional Security Office to set up a meeting with the letter writer at a location that could
be watched and where an armed response would be possible were she to be threatened.
No one showed up for the meeting, and I am not aware that the author was ever identified.
In the letter, he said he was a corporal in the Treasury Police.
30
This event is discussed in detail below.
31
“Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.” translates from the French as “In charge of business in the
interim.” The embassy has only two positions with duties related to all activities of all
agencies, the ambassador and his number two, the deputy chief of mission (DCM). When
the ambassador is out of the country for any reason, the DCM automatically becomes
Chargé.
32
NODIS is an exceptionally narrow diplomatic channel. The cable is dated 1981 San
Salvador 0096, 6 January 1981; declassified and released, July 12, 2006.
29
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Salvador. Their aim was to “destabilize the country and overthrow
the junta, and using their tactics, bombing factories and offices,
kidnaping businessmen … The object is to terrorize those who are
still working for a moderate outcome … and impose a rightist
dictatorship.” According to Dion’s report, the grand plan was to
wreck the economy and bring to power a “good military officer
who will carry out a total cleansing, killing three or four or five
hundred thousand people, whatever it takes to get rid of all the
communists and their allies.” Then the country could be
reconstructed on a new foundation with property rights secured
forever. Dion closed his cable with a plea for Washington to do
something about the fact that all this was taking place “in a major
American city.” Dion’s cable had no discernable effect. Most of
the individuals named continued to live in Miami.
On January 10, 1981, the FMLN announced its “final offensive.”
Their aim most likely was to establish operational control over the
Department of Morazán in the far northeast of the country. The
FMLN believed they would spark a widespread uprising and, by
declaring the northeast a “liberated zone,” secure international
recognition. The mass uprising did not materialize and the final
offensive fizzled.
As incontrovertible evidence came in that Nicaragua was
supporting the FMLN with arms, and with only days remaining in
office, the Carter administration found itself astride a dilemma:
On the one hand, they faced a Salvadoran government whose
forces were involved in wholesale and egregious human rights
abuses; these forces had murdered American citizens and were
barely pretending to carry out investigations of the murders.
On the other, it was no longer possible to believe this was a purely
internal Salvadoran issue. Arms smuggled from Nicaragua into El
Salvador were fueling the “final offensive.”
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Figuratively on his way out the door, President Carter signed the
finding that again permitted military assistance to El Salvador.
It was Reagan’s problem now.
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V. The Reagan Administration
Just as Ronald Reagan took the oath of office, the hostages from
the U.S. embassy in Tehran left Iranian airspace. Although it was the
Iranians who had timed this to inflict maximum humiliation on President
Carter, it almost seemed that the sunny, optimistic President Reagan had
made it happen.
The embrace of El Salvador’s junta was not an inescapable priority
for Congress or the public. The Reagan administration chose to make it so.
Yes, El Salvador was nearby, but the purely military case was hard to
make. The administration effectively made El Salvador the global symbol
of America leading the West, stopping or even rolling back communist
totalitarians.
Since the Iron Curtain descended, the right-most elements of the
Republican Party had denounced the actions of presidents Franklin
Roosevelt and Harry Truman and their administrations as sell-outs to the
Soviet Union and communism. To many, the subsequent gains of the
communists in China, Cuba, and most recently Vietnam showed
communism advancing inexorably. They saw an obvious line from Yalta
to San Salvador.
The foreign policy team, headed by National Security Advisor
Richard V. Allen, considered Carter’s foreign policy a failure on its face
and intended to change things quickly. Secretary of State Al Haig spoke of
“drawing a line in the sand” and “going to the source” (i.e., Cuba).33
The overall view of the Reagan administration can be gleaned by
the following excerpts from talking points sent by National Security
Council staffers Alfonso Sapia-Bosch and Oliver North to National

33

Haig frequently used this term. The meaning was the Cuba was the source of
revolutionary activity in Latin America. See “Why U.S. Has Cuba Jitters,” Christian
Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1981,
http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/1118/111835.html/%28page%29/2.
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Security Advisor William P. Clark on April 13, 1983.34 The points were
intended for Clark to use in his effort to persuade U.S. Representative
Edward P. Boland (D-MA) to revise pending legislation so as to permit
funding for the Nicaraguan contras:
We have not added to instability in the region. The Nicaraguans
began their activities shortly after assuming power in July 1979.
Had the U.S. not become involved, we would have already lost El
Salvador; Honduras would be on the way; and Guatemala would
be next. …
If we withdraw our support from the Contras now, we stand to
destroy the credibility we have been rebuilding since Vietnam.
Not only will we be accused of standing in the way of freedom,
liberty, and democracy, but the Soviets and the Cubans will have
new opportunities to step up their involvement in the area. This
fact will not be missed on [sic] those in the Mideast and NATO,
who are watching this situation closely as a measure of U.S.
resolve and commitment.

A. Personnel Initiative
The first order of business was to get Carter administration
holdovers out of the way. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White was
removed almost immediately. All the Latin America staffers on the
National Security Council were removed, and no Foreign Service officers
were named to replace them.35 Several officers in the Office of Central
American Affairs at the State Department were reassigned. The new Latin
America team was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for
Interamerican Affairs Thomas O. Enders, a career officer who had never
34

Declassified July 25, 2013.
Many in the Reagan administration, especially on the National Security Council staff,
considered Foreign Service officers to be unreliable liberals until proven otherwise.
35
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served in Latin America and spoke no Spanish. State’s new director of
Central American Affairs, L. Craig Johnstone, was new to the region,
having previously served in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
Within days of White’s removal, the administration dispatched
Fredric L. Chapin (who had been on detail to the Department of Defense)
as Chargé d’Affaires in El Salvador.36 Two weeks later, they nominated
Senior Foreign Service Officer Deane R. Hinton, who had served on the
National Security Council staff during the Nixon administration and who
had previously served as ambassador to Zaire and as assistant secretary of
state for economic and business affairs.

B. Military and Diplomatic Initiatives
Military teams were dispatched to El Salvador almost immediately.
Their purpose was to determine the scope and priority for assistance. The
Reagan administration understood that military assistance was an urgent
necessity; but also knew full well that military assistance alone would be
insufficient.
On February 17, 1981, four weeks to the day after the
administration took office, Secretary of State Alexander Haig briefed the
ambassadors of the NATO countries plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Spain.
Following are some excerpts from that briefing:37
A well-orchestrated international Communist campaign
designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from the internal
conflict to an increasingly internationalized confrontation is under
36

This was understood to be temporary. White had been relieved and a new ambassador
would have to gain Senate concurrence. A Chargé does not require Senate approval.
37
The following material appeared in the New York Times on 21 January 1981. The fact
that the extended excerpts are verbatim and include off-the-record material indicates that
this was almost certainly an “authorized leak.”
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way. With Cuban coordination, the Soviet bloc, Vietnam, Ethiopia,
and radical Arabs are furnishing at least several hundred tons of
military equipment to the Salvadoran leftist insurgents. Most of
this equipment, not all but most, has entered via Nicaragua, and
this morning we will be briefing you in some detail on the
intelligence we have gathered and which we consider irrefutable.
I want to emphasize that the Government in El Salvador is
a coalition, headed by a true Christian Democrat, Napoleon Duarte.
It includes moderate military and independent civilians.
I also want to emphasize and know you are aware that El
Salvador and its Government have been plagued by dissension.
Nevertheless, despite terrorist attacks from both left and right, it
has proceeded with a reform program and does offer some hope for
the future. …
The extreme left has thus far failed to topple the existing
Government in El Salvador. The revolutionaries' recent large
military operation has failed. We have also seen the dwindling
support in the popular sector for the revolutionaries. The left is
increasingly under Marxist domination and Cuban influence, and it
has clearly opted for a military solution. The Communist nations
intervened in 1980 to provide the insurgents with large amounts of
military supplies, and we have evidence outlining this in detail,
which we will give you this morning.
During the first weeks of this administration we have taken
a number of steps to deal with this situation. After, and only after,
the external intervention, we furnished the Salvadoran Government
the additional military assistance it urgently needs to meet the
threat of the Cuban-supported guerrillas. There were no lethal
military supplies before that—none—until large-scale military
attacks had been executed. We are also continuing to disburse the
$63 million in fiscal year 1981 economic aid which was already
programmed for El Salvador, and we are now conducting an
extensive interagency study to determine what additional support
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may be necessary in the near future. We will be consulting further
with you from time to time on this. We believe additional help is
needed. …
The Communist countries are orchestrating an intensive
international disinformation campaign to cover their intervention
while discrediting the Salvadoran Government and American
support for that Government.
As most of you know, we are sending representatives to
Europe and Latin America to present the evidence of a Communist
involvement and to seek support and understanding for our actions.
Over the next few weeks I will be meeting with key foreign
leaders, as they visit Washington, to discuss the issue in greater
detail.
Our most urgent objective is to stop the large flow of arms
through Nicaragua into El Salvador. We consider what is
happening is part of the global Communist campaign coordinated
by Havana and Moscow to support the Marxist guerrillas in El
Salvador.
The policy implications are already clear: First, the U.S.G.
[United States Government] supports and will continue to support
the present Government in El Salvador. We intend to work with
that Government with the objective of achieving social justice and
stability in that strife-torn country.
Second, the U.S.G. is convinced that neither stability nor
social justice in El Salvador is possible as long as Communist
subversion continues.
Third, we will not remain passive in the face of this
Communist challenge, a systematic, well-financed, sophisticated
effort to impose a Communist regime in Central America.
This effort involves close coordination by Moscow,
satellite capitals and Havana, with the cooperation of Hanoi and
Managua. It is a repetition of the pattern we have already seen in
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Angola and Ethiopia, and, I may add, elsewhere. It is a threat, in
our view, not just to the United States but to the West at large.
We have not yet decided on the precise steps we will take
to deal with the situation; we will, however, in some way have to
deal with the immediate source of the problem—and that is Cuba.
Off the record, I wish to assure you we do not intend to
have another Vietnam and engage ourselves in another bloody
conflict where the source rests outside the target area.
We believe in all sincerity we have no alternative but to act
to prevent forces hostile to the U.S. and the West from
overthrowing a government on our doorstep, particularly when that
government offers the best hope of progress toward moderate
democracy.
Q. Will a copy of this briefing be made available to us?
A. Not at the moment. We are in a consulting phase with many of
your governments and the bipartisan leadership in Congress. We
are faced with a four-legged stool:
One leg is what we should do in manifesting support of and
encouraging reform in El Salvador.
The second leg is the problem of Nicaragua and the urgent
need to put an end to the illicit arms traffic to El Salvador from
Nicaragua—a country which has received millions of dollars in
U.S. economic support.
The third leg I would call the external disinformation
campaign designed to paint the revolutionary effort as distinctively
apart from outside interventionist activity.
The fourth leg is the problem of Cuba. We do not anticipate
dealing with that situation in the historic sense of what we did in
Vietnam. We are studying a number of alternatives. I have nothing
further to add on this except to assure you that we see happening
here in El Salvador what happened in Africa and Southwest Asia—
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and that is dangerous not only for the U.S. but for all nations that
share our values.
Obviously the purpose of this briefing is to share with you
the facts we have uncovered. As you know, it has been my strong
belief that we cannot hope to consult and coordinate unless we
have the same basis of facts. Thus I hope that your governments
would consider these facts and that they would not do anything
against what the U.S. is trying to do until they had looked at this
information.
Q. You said that you would not repeat Vietnam, that you would get
at the source of the problem. Could you elaborate?
A. Only to emphasize that we are studying various sources of
information. I would not want your reporting to show our position
as overly dramatic.
Q. Has Moscow been apprised of your concern?
A. I think you know there have been exchanges. Yes, there have
been a number of exchanges with Ambassador Dobrynin. There
has also been—I say it because it has been in the press—with
Gromyko. There is a growing concern over Soviet risk-taking.
There is concern over the situation in Poland.38
Q. You did not mention the adjacent countries.
A. We have, for example, conveyed to the Government of Panama
the information conveyed in this briefing, but without the same
degree of specificity. I know that these governments are aware of
our increasing concern about intervention—above all, Cuban.
Q. Is there a time deadline?
A. No, and I think it most appropriate that there not be. I think you
are aware of the provision of the U.S. law, which is relevant to the
case of Nicaragua, that countries that engage in external
38

At the time Haig was speaking, the Solidarity movement was beginning to make a
serious, concerted challenge to communist rule. –D.H.
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intervention must lose U.S. economic assistance and even must
pay back what has been already provided. We have brought this to
the attention of the Nicaraguans and given them time to consider.
They have assured us they would stop infiltration, but given past
history we are skeptical.
Q. What is the balance between the guerrillas and the
Government?
A. The guerrillas have not achieved public support. There is a hard
core of 4,000, about a quarter of the strength of Salvador's security
force. The effort to overthrow the regime in January was a failure.
Now the guerrillas are in nodes of resistance around the
country, including in selective assassination of Government
officials. The situation is under reasonable control, but there is
always the possibility of further external intervention along the
lines of what happened in Ethiopia.39 And there is also the
possibility of Nicaraguan intervention.

C. A Legislative Offensive
Congressional support was essential for the most basic of all
reasons. For the executive branch to work on any problem requires that
any administration have two things that only Congress can provide. The
first is authorization to conduct an activity. Authorizations are generally
broad, but every activity must be authorized and the authorizing
committee(s) can shut down almost any program. The key authorizing
committees for El Salvador were the same as for most international
activities: foreign affairs/foreign relations, armed services, and
intelligence.
The second, and perhaps even more important, is an appropriation.
The appropriations committees dole out money to the various departments
39

In 1977, Cuba, with Soviet backing, put thousands of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. – D.H.
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of government. They can use their constitutional power40 to control federal
policies and practices in as much detail as they wish. For example, they
could say something like “no funds made available under this
appropriation shall be used to arm, equip, train, or otherwise assist the
police or armed forces of El Salvador.”

D. A Public Affairs Offensive
Understandably, many Reagan administration officials were in the
news. They blanketed the (then) three major networks and CNN. Secretary
of State Haig was the most prominent, but none left anyone doubting that
El Salvador was the administration’s number-one foreign policy priority.
While the Reagan administration moved quickly on the diplomatic,
military (assistance): and political/congressional fronts, the
political/congressional piece could not be sustained without the support of
the American people.41 Here, the left was way out front. Salvadoran Farid
Handal founded the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El
Salvador, better known as CISPES,42 while he was touring the U.S. to
drum up opposition to Carter administration support for the junta. Farid
Handal is the brother of Schafik Handal. Schafik was the head of the
Communist Party of El Salvador and led it into armed opposition and
participation in the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, which under
Castro’s tutelage became the FMLN.

(art. I. § 9) says: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law.”
41
This is more than junior-high civics. If the American people will not support, or at least
acquiesce to, a program, it will lose funding.
42
It is hard to document Farid Handal as the founder, but there is no doubt that Handal
was in the U.S. at the time CISPES was founded.
40
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Fueled by outrages such as the murder of Archbishop Romero and
the American nuns,43 CISPES chapters opened in many cities around the
U.S. The CISPES chapters became a potent (but not overwhelming) force.
They vociferously opposed support for the Salvadoran government and
carried out classic protests, such as occupying the Chicago office of
Illinois Senator Charles Percy. CISPES chapters were frequently
associated with churches.
Most CISPES supporters were unaware of the organization’s links
to Salvador’s Communist Party and the FMLN. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which was aware of this link, twice investigated CISPES. At
first, the FBI wanted to see if CISPES was an “agent of a foreign power”
and thus forced to register with the Justice Department. The other
investigation looked into possible support for terrorism. In both cases, the
FBI found no criminal activity. As an inevitable consequence of these
investigations, a lot of perfectly innocent Americans ended up being
identified in FBI investigative files.44
Inside the National Security Council and in the foreign affairs
agencies, “public diplomacy” strategies were being drafted, reviewed, and
redrafted. Projects undreamed of for many years, such as adding Voice of
America transmitters, were suddenly welcome.
The Administration had no ready mechanism to counterbalance
CISPES. But they did have their bully pulpits, as with this March 19, 1981
CNN interview of Secretary of State Al Haig:
What we are watching is a four-phased operation of which phase
one has already been completed—the seizure of Nicaragua, next
The U.S. Embassy always used the term “churchwomen” because three of the four
murdered women were nuns. The fourth, Jean Donovan, was a religious lay worker. For
reasons of familiarity and convenience, this paper will henceforward use “nuns.”
44
Predictably, it came to light that the FBI was taking down the license numbers in the
parking lots of Unitarian churches. The FBI got slapped around for this, but they were
doing their job.
43
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is El Salvador, to be followed by Honduras and Guatemala. It’s
clear and explicit. … I wouldn’t call it necessarily a domino
theory. I would call it a priority target list—a hit list, if you
will—for the ultimate takeover of Central America.45
What the administration did not have was a way of using official
funds to conduct systematic lower-level outreach, as a political campaign
might do—and as the FMLN was already doing via CISPES.
The government agency most capable of doing so was the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA).46 But USIA was forbidden by law to
undertake any activity directed to American citizens.47 In 1983, the
administration created a special office at the State Department—S/LPD.
The “S” indicated that it was a direct bureaucratic dependency of the
Secretary of State; the “LPD” stood for Latin American Public
Diplomacy. Although the S/LPD was housed at the State Department, it
was effectively controlled by Lt. Col. Oliver North’s office at the National
Security Council. S/LPD worked to persuade the American people of the
wisdom of supporting the government of El Salvador and of opposing the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. S/LPD was disbanded after the Iran–Contra
affair, when investigators questioned the legal authority for S/LPD’s
actions.
This public affairs offensive was not window dressing. With broad
public outrage in the U.S. over the murder of the American nuns and all
the other horror stories coming out of El Salvador, American public and
congressional opinion, never far out of sync, were of profound
For more information, see B. Gwertzman, “Haig Cites ‘Hit List’ for Soviet Control of
Central America,” New York Times, March 18, 1981,
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/19/world/haig-cites-hit-list-for-soviet-control-ofcentral-america.html
46
Later absorbed into the State Department.
47
Forbidding programming directed to U.S. citizens was intended to prevent taxpayer
funds intended to influence foreigners from being diverted to partisan advantage for any
incumbent administration.
45

37

HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s

importance. The Reagan administration had, with eyes wide open , chosen
to make El Salvador an issue. Theodore Roosevelt was right about the
presidency being a “bully pulpit”; every president has the power to call
attention to a subject. What a president cannot do is determine what the
press and public will see and say once they start examining that same
subject. The administration had to convince the American people that this
was important, that it was the right thing to do, and that it was “winnable.”
At no point did public affairs take a back seat to the other elements of
Salvador policy.
All the this activity provoked notice and a call for caution. A New
York Times editorial summed up the situation:
Can it be that there’s method in the madness of tying
President Reagan’s prestige to that of a junta in a coffee-bean
republic?
In a flash, the El Salvador junta’s struggle against 4,000
guerrillas has been made front-page news. The Kremlin is told that
fateful negotiations over nuclear arms depend on that junta’s
success. Diplomats tour the world warning that whoever does not
side with America in this effort invites retribution. Cuba has been
threatened with blockade, and Mexico has been thus provoked into
a show of sympathy for Cuba. All this for El Salvador?
There can be only one rational explanation. Mr. Reagan
foresees a quick win over the guerrillas and wants to advertise
American muscle by making an exhibition game look like a World
Series triumph …
The junta may need more economic aid. But to lavish
weapons on it now will only strengthen the right-wing extremists
in its ranks, the ones who have been frustrating social justice and
land reform and turning peasants into rebels ...
That effort requires not bellicosity in Washington but
shrewd diplomacy by all the Caribbean democracies, notably
Mexico and Venezuela. Without an effective political program,
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Mr. Reagan’s ostentatious strutting in a place of no strategic
moment will indeed impress the world, but not in the way he
intends.48

Who won the public affairs offensive? The Reagan administration
has to be counted as the winner. The administration got what it wanted and
needed from Congress to carry out its policies, and the policy was more of
a success than a failure. But the costs in damaged credibility and proper
understanding of events linger. A cruise through the Internet will turn up
thousands of pages of reporting and commentary outlining human rights
abuses and war crimes in El Salvador and claims of misdeeds by U.S.
officials. There is scant discussion of the misdeeds of the left. The fact of
communist countries supplying arms is skipped or treated as paranoid
fantasy. Little is said of FMLN rights abuses—including the murder of
surrendered soldiers. If El Salvador comes up in popular entertainment, it
is invariably cited not as the place where communism stopped, but as a
horror story of U.S.-supported death squads, dead priests and nuns, and
shorthand for U.S. misdeeds.
Communism has failed and El Salvador is a democracy, but
CISPES still exists and has expanded its scope to include solidarity with
Venezuela.

“Psychodrama in El Salvador,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1981,
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/27/opinion/psychodrama-in-el-salvador.html
48
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VI. Policy to Practice
As the Reagan administration set out to reverse the grim situation
in El Salvador, abstractions became actionable. How do you put concepts
such as “a 55-man limit” or “equipped for combat” or “hostilities are
imminent“ into practice?

A. The War Powers Act
Of all these vague issues, none was more important or urgent than
clarifying the War Powers Act. The Act was enacted in 1973 over
President Nixon’s veto. Its purpose was to limit any president’s powers to
send U.S. forces into battle without the explicit consent of Congress. To
give a president the authority to respond to immediate threats without the
entanglement of immediate congressional approval, presidents were
permitted to deploy troops for a time without reporting. Many of its
provisions were unclear and had never really been tested in court—and
still have not. A Congressional Research Service unclassified analysis49 in
March of 2004 included a section on El Salvador:
El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent
Hostilities?
One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy
because it was never reported under the War Powers Resolution
was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador. At the
end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the
dispatch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its
government against guerilla warfare. There were already 19
military advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration.
Perkins, Gerald M., ed., “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years”
(Hauppauge, NY: Novinka Books, 2005), pp. 11-12,
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html.
49
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The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were organized and
armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14,
the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including
experts in combat training.
The President did not report the situation under the War
Powers Resolution. A State Department memorandum said a report
was not required because the U.S. personnel were not being
introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The
memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances occurred
that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution
would be complied with. A justification for not reporting under
section 4(a)(2) was that the military personnel being introduced
were not equipped for combat. They would, it was maintained,
carry only personal sidearms that they were authorized to use only
in their own defense or the defense of other Americans.
The State Department held that section 8(c) of the War
Powers Resolution was not intended to require a report when U.S.
military personnel might be involved in training foreign military
personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S.
personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador, the
memorandum said, U.S. military personnel “will not act as combat
advisors, and will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on
operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is
likely.”
On May 1, 1981, 11 members of Congress challenged the
president's action by filing suit on the grounds that he had violated
the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the
advisers to El Salvador. Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but
by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members (13 Senators and
16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit,
contending that a number of legislative measures were then
pending before Congress and that Congress had ample opportunity
to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.
41

HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s

On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens
Green dismissed the suit. She ruled that Congress, not the court,
must resolve the question of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador
were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation. While
there might be situations in which a court could conclude that U.S.
forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the “subtleties of
fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political
branches.” She noted that Congress had taken no action to show it
believed the President's decision was subject to the War Powers
Resolution. On November 18, 1983, a Federal circuit court
affirmed the dismissal and on June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court
declined consideration of an appeal of that decision.
As the involvement continued and casualties occurred
among the U.S. military advisers, various legislative proposals
relating to the War Powers Resolution and El Salvador were
introduced. Some proposals required a specific authorization prior
to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El
Salvador. Other proposals declared that the commitment of U.S.
Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated compliance with section
4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring the President to
submit a report.
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported that the President had “a
clear obligation under the War Powers Resolution to consult with
Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat forces to
El Salvador.” On July 26, 1983, the House rejected an amendment
to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 2969) to limit the number
of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the
President reported any increase above that level under section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Nevertheless, the
Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.
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As this ex post facto CRS compilation makes clear, the War
Powers Act and the Reagan administration’s careful avoidance of its
triggers guided military action in El Salvador in two critical ways. First, it
created the 55-man limit on the size of the MILGRP. Although this limit
never had the force of law, it became an informal but honored deal
between the administration and Congress: Keep it at 55 and we the
leadership will not seek a confrontation over the War Powers Act. The
second was the administration’s pledge to Congress that U.S. military
personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany
Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other
situation where combat is likely.” This second pledge defined the
operational boundaries for U.S. personnel.

B. “The 55-Man Limit”
Congress and the administration had agreed to this limit with little
discussion or rancor. This was something like a handshake deal. When
some members attempted to write it into law, they failed.
This seems like the way policy and politics ought to work.
Honorable individuals of two branches of government and two parties
decide what the issue is—we want to avoid creeping from training and
advice to full-scale involvement à la Vietnam. How do you do it? You
keep the numbers too small to get into real trouble. What size is that?
The 55-man limit, in which so many put so much stock (and many
thought was the law of the land) was arbitrary and had been reached in
offhand fashion. The exchange, which took place in a public hearing, went
something like this:
Congress: How many men do you plan on sending down there?
Administration: Not many.
Congress: How many are there right now?
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Administration (after checking with staff present at the hearing):
About 55.
Congress: Do you think you can live with that?
Administration (after further checking with staff): Yes.
That was it. Rumors that the limit had been inspired by the
previous nationwide speed limit of 55 mph were false.
So far, so good.
But which military personnel were to be counted in the 55-man
limit?
Surely Congress did not mean to count the Defense Attaché’s staff,
did they? Marine Security Guards? What about the MILGRP permanent
party of six? If you counted all the military personnel in the embassy, you
would already be close to the limit.
Rules about who counted were roughed out, mostly at the embassy,
and then vetted informally with the administration and Congress. Here is
what emerged:






Defense Attachés and their support staff did not count.
Marine Security Guards did not count.
Seabees, who periodically serviced or installed technical security
equipment around the embassy, did not count.
After a few years, permanent party at the MILGRP did not count.
Brief moments during a single day did not count, but remaining
overnight (RON) did.

That meant that the 55 men were TDY military personnel who
came to El Salvador to conduct military training, essentially all MTTs.
MILGRP staff took this seriously. The executive officer kept the
tally. From time to time, some MTT member (or entire team) would get an
urgent instruction: “We are up against the limit. We have got some
personnel arriving this afternoon on an urgent mission. Go to Ilopango Air
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Base and take the C-130 to Panama. No mistakes, if you miss the flight we
are over the limit. Stay at Southcom until we send for you.”
With time, the rules were eased.
The six-man permanent party in the MILGRP was insufficient to
support all the movement of all the supplies and MTTs flowing into the
country. Congress was notified, did not object, and the staff was increased
to 12.
After about 18 months, it became obvious that Salvadoran soldiers
injured on the battlefield were dying or becoming permanently disabled
because Salvadoran battlefield medics were insufficient in numbers and
deficient in training. The U.S. had the capacity to train them, but did not
have a means to do so within the 55-man limit. Eventually Congress
informally agreed to exclude members of a medical MTT from the count.
All this was possible because it became clear the administration
was operating in good faith. MTT members were not being sent on combat
missions (and when a few did, they were disciplined and sent home).
Similarly neither the MILGRP nor the broader mission50 was attempting to
sneak in off-the-books personnel.
In time, the 55-man limit ceased to be a topic of anything more
than minor administrative interest. Congress became confident that their
insistence on this point was respected, and its demands for head-count
reports dwindled.
El Salvador specialists at State and Defense came to regard the
limit as a blessing. The hard ceiling on personnel effectively and
permanently closed off any chance of “Americanizing” the fight. No
bureaucratic or political blood was spilled trying to ward off unwelcome
The “mission” spoken of here and henceforward, unless context makes another
meaning clear, follows State Department usage and means the embassy as a whole, the
“diplomatic mission.” Understanding that all executive branch personnel were part of the
embassy—that is, the diplomatic mission—is essential. Everyone at the mission worked
for the ambassador before anyone else. The term of art is “under chief-of-mission
authority.”
50
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pressures for American troops to do more. The Green Berets, Rangers, and
SEALs who ran the program knew of T.E. Lawrence’s dictum about
“eating soup with a knife,”51 and the 55-man limit removed the temptation
to ignore Lawrence’s rule “just this once.”
The limit also brought an even subtler but perhaps more valuable
benefit: The military personnel assigned to the MTTs, especially the most
senior officers, were generally excellent. With a ceiling of 12 permanent
party and 55 with non-medical MTTs, MILGRP commanders were able to
request, and often received, the very best our military had to offer. At least
in the early going, the caliber of MTT personnel, including Spanishspeakers, was clearly exceptional.52

C. Equipped for Combat?

February 14, 1982
U.S. TELLS OFFICER WHO CARRIED RIFLE TO LEAVE
SALVADOR
After CNN aired video of five U.S. military personnel dressed in
Hawaiian shirts or guayaberas, carrying M-16 rifles, the fat was briefly in

51

As the story goes, T.E. Lawrence (a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia) said that it was important
to let foreign forces do things themselves. He acknowledged that this might be messy,
“like eating soup with a knife.”
52
This view is not universal. On March 29, 1988, the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard
University sponsored the “Small Wars Symposium: The Case of El Salvador.” This
seminar was based on a paper presented by LTC A.J. Bacevitch, LTC James D. Hallums,
LTC Richard H. White, and LTC Thomas F. Young entitled “American Military Policy
in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador.” The paper (sometimes called “The Four
Colonels Report”) suggested that the military did not properly recognize those who
served in El Salvador. See Bacevitch et al., “American Military Policy in Small Wars:
The Case of El Salvador” (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1988).
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the fire—and the flames reached the Oval Office. On February 12, 1982,
President Reagan ordered an investigation of the incident.
On February 13, Ambassador Deane Hinton, acting on his
authority as the president’s personal representative in El Salvador, ordered
Lt. Colonel Harry Melander to leave El Salvador. Hinton said that Lt. Col.
Melander was “a first-class officer who made a mistake.” Melander had
been in Usulután province with four other officers to visit and perhaps to
help Salvadoran soldiers repair a bridge that had been blown up by the
FMLN. The other officers were given what Ambassador Hinton described
as “firm, oral reprimands.”53
While swift public action kept this from becoming a major incident,
two ill effects were created: First, the U.S. military’s media-averse habits
were reinforced, and, second, the idea was established in the press corps
and other places that a soldier carrying an M-16 was on a combat mission.
It seemed to go right over everyone’s head that no professional soldier
would voluntarily go into combat wearing khakis and a Hawaiian shirt.
Taped to the inside of MILGRP Commander John Waghelstein’s
door was an 8″×10″ photo of Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-Kansas)
walking down a Salvadoran street. She was in El Salvador to observe the
March 1982 elections. Walking alongside her was a bodyguard from the
State Department’s Diplomatic Security bureau. He wore a fine pinstriped
suit and carried a loaded M-16 with his hand on the pistol grip and the butt
cradled in his elbow. Stuck to the photo was a red ribbon impressed with
the embassy’s official seal (borrowed for the occasion from the consul
general). The caption below the photo read: “State Department Award for
who gets to carry M-16s in El Salvador.”
As things played out in practice, MILGRP personnel were the only
members of the mission whose armaments were restricted by anything

Bonner, Raymond, “U.S. Tells Officer Who Carried Rifle to Leave Salvador,” New
York Times Feb. 13, 1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/14/world/us-tells-officerwho-carried-rifle-to-leave-salvador.html.
53
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other than common sense. Many, perhaps most, mission members carried
handguns with varying degrees of concealment. Long guns at home or in a
vehicle were commonplace.
Sometimes participating in a farce is the price you pay for doing
your job.
Most military trainers and MILGRP staff carried a pistol in one of
the barely big enough “man purses” widely available at the time. The
small bags were, at a time when sexual orientation was completely
unprotected in the military (and almost everywhere else): called “fag
bags.” They were popular not only with the MILGRP but with many
Salvadoran civilians. Sitting in a restaurant, one might see conservatively
dressed businessmen put their small bag down on the table and hear a
resounding THUNK from the completely obvious contents.
By early 1983, the question of M-16s or other personal weapons
was coming to be recognized for its essential silliness. During one of his
regular meetings with the press, MILGRP Commander Waghelstein was
asked if he felt a .45 was sufficient protection. He responded by saying, “I
carry a gym bag. There is a piece of Israeli steel in the bag. When that
steel gets nervous, it stutters in Hebrew.” None of the journalists thought it
newsworthy to write that our soldiers did not limit themselves to pistols.
All discussions about how MILGRP members might be permitted
protect themselves ended on May 25, 1983. That is when MILGRP
Executive Officer Lt. Cmdr. Albert A. Schaufelberger, Jr. was
assassinated on the campus of the Central American University. From then
on, MILGRP personnel armed themselves as they saw fit.

D. “Where Is the Combat Zone?”

U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS ARE FOUND IN A COMBAT ZONE
IN EL SALVADOR
By RAYMOND BONNER
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SAN MARCOS LEMPA, El Salvador, June 23—In an
apparent violation of restrictions governing their activities in El
Salvador, American military advisers were encountered in a
combat area on the Lempa River here today.
Salvadoran soldiers said they had seen the Americans carry
M-16 automatic rifles. State Department regulations prohibit them
from carrying automatic rifles or being in combat zones.
Two Salvadoran soldiers guarding the Lempa River Bridge
here, 40 miles southeast of San Salvador, said the armed
Americans were seen at the bridge Tuesday and this morning.
There was sporadic firing of automatic weapons and the thud of
mortars as an O-2 spotter plane circled overhead.
Salvadoran soldiers patrolled in the fields and along the
highway where a bus was burning. They said guerrillas had
attacked the bus in the morning. The rebel radio said Tuesday that
traffic along the highway would be subject to attack beginning
today.54
The final two paragraphs of the story carried the embassy
response:
In San Salvador, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy, Don
Hamilton, said on being told by the reporters what the had seen on
the Lempa River:
“We are now investigating. If the guidelines have been
violated, appropriate action will be taken.” In February, an Army
officer, Lieut. Col. Harry Melander, was sent home after he had

Bonner, Raymond, “U.S. Military Advisers Are Found in a Combat Zone in El
Salvador,” New York Times, June 23, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/24/world/us-military-advisers-are-found-in-a-combatzone-in-el-salvador.html.
54
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been seen carrying an M-16, and four other Americans received
reprimands.55
This story raises a number of issues about fair reportage and
government honesty:








55

Tendentiousness (“in apparent violation”): The facts in the story
(aside from technical assertions noted below) are narrowly correct,
but the article as a whole seems designed to demonstrate that U.S.
soldiers were in combat.
Questionable assertions (“encountered in a combat area”): What
is a “combat area”? The U.S. Embassy itself had been rocketed and
strafed about two dozen times at this point. On the other hand, the
bridge on the Rio Lempa was unquestionably more volatile than
the capital.
Lack of precision: There was never a “State Department
regulation” prohibiting U.S. military personnel from “being in
combat zones.” This is a technicality, but technicalities matter.
Regulations on these issues came from the U.S. ambassador and
amounted to embassy regulations conveyed from the president’s
personal representative down through the chain of command. No
area of El Salvador was off-limits to military personnel or anyone
else. They were under orders to avoid combat. The best test was
simple: Were American soldiers going “in harm’s way”? Were
they accompanying Salvadorans on combat operations?
Sourcing: One must read the article closely to discover that while
reporters saw two U.S. soldiers in fatigues in military camp,
accounts of the soldiers firing weapons are secondhand.

Ibid.
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Man on a mission: One element of the story says a “van with
reporters” pulled up to the military camp. No other reporters
considered the “story” to be worth reporting.

Several weeks later, at the farewell party for the MILGRP exec as
he left for onward assignment, he confessed to the PAO that he had lied.56
There had been an attack by the guerrillas and the sergeant had
participated in repelling the attack.
The PAO did not conceal his anger. His credibility and that of the
embassy had been at stake. There had been nothing to hide; the sergeant
was defending himself when he came under attack in the course of training
Salvadoran military personnel. But now there was something to hide—
misleading the New York Times.
The lieutenant colonel was apologetic, but defended his action: “I
did not know you then … was not sure I could trust you.” He went on to
say that the sergeant had reported the incident, but that he, the lieutenant
colonel, had decided to shelve the matter, to say nothing to anyone.
The PAO was hardly assuaged: “If you play straight with me, I can
handle just about anything short of criminality. You have put the mission
at risk by lying to me. We could have announced self-defense and stood
our ground.”
Nothing further happened with regard to the incident, which passed
as simply another case of he-said/she-said.
If the PAO had known before Bonner’s call and perhaps after, he
could likely have persuaded the ambassador to let him make a preemptive
announcement, something like: “While conducting training, a U.S. soldier
and his Salvadoran trainees came under fire. He and his trainees returned
fire. There were no casualties.” Such an announcement, either
preemptively or in response to a question, makes a circumstance seem less
secretive and sinister. Were a formal announcement made, it would have
56

Source is direct personal experience of the author.
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gone to all available media, taking away the Times exclusive—an
announcement is less interesting than a media “discovery.”
Flare-ups about American military personnel being in “combat
zones” notwithstanding, the media, Congress, and everyone else came to
understand within about a year that there were no “combat zones” in El
Salvador.
There were areas where guerrilla activity was very high or
persistent, but the Salvadoran Army could and did go anywhere in the
country. When they entered an area of strong guerrilla influence, they
might encounter small, improvised land mines, booby traps really, but the
FMLN had no intention of letting the Salvadoran army maneuver them in
a set piece battle. They knew the army would pin them down with infantry
and then hammer them with air and artillery.
When they saw the army out in strength, they did what sensible
guerrillas do—they melted away.
As the “combat zone” non-issue faded, the real question began to
emerge: What are combat operations? This is a sensible and important
distinction. From President Reagan on down, no one wanted our troops
involved in operations.

E. What Are Combat Operations?
The War of Stanley’s Leg
With perhaps 30,000 dead in El Salvador at the time, it is hard to
believe that an E-6 with a leg wound would make news around the United
States. But it happened. This story, from the Spokane Chronicle of
February 5, 1983 is typical:
3 Relieved of Duties in El Salvador Injury
WASHINGTON (AP) – Two U.S. warrant officers and a
sergeant have been relieved of their duties in El Salvador because
of an incident in which another American military adviser was
52
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wounded during a helicopter mission, a Pentagon spokesman said
today.
A statement initially released this morning by the U.S.
Embassy in El Salvador also disclosed that another American
military trainer went on a separate “operational” flight which took
ground fire at about the same time. U.S. military advisers have
standing orders not to participate in such operations.
Lt. Col. Richard Rapp provided the text of the embassy
statement dealing with Wednesday’s incident, in which Staff Sgt.
Jay Thomas Stanley, 25, of Towson, Md., suffered a leg wound
from ground fire.
Stanley was the first American soldier wounded in El
Salvador since U.S. military advisers were sent to the Central
American nation in 1981. The force is limited to 55 personnel, but
there were 37 advisers in the country Thursday. …
The embassy said that “as a result of our findings, two
warrant officers and one master sergeant have been relieved of
their duties by the USMILGROUP (U.S. military advisory group
in El Salvador) commander and will leave the country on the next
available military aircraft.”57

Issues for Discussion:




Why were the MILGRP and the embassy so forthcoming about a
minor injury and administrative relief of two warrant officers and a
master sergeant?
This was a minor thing; why not keep it secret?

“3 Relieved of Duties in El Salvador Injury,” Spokane Chronicle, Feb. 5, 1983, p. 9,
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1345&dat=19830205&id=5epWAAAAIBAJ&s
jid=c_kDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3937,1869902.
57
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Why publicize punitive reassignments at this level?
Wouldn’t it have been easier to just give everyone involved a good
talking to? They would keep their mouths shut.

The ambassador, the MILGRP commander, and the public affairs
counselor instinctively knew and agreed that a one-day splash with plenty
of facts was better than a story coming out in dribs and drabs. Were the
story to get into the press from a non-government source, or worse yet, an
unidentified government source, the embassy and by extension the
administration would appear to be covering up combat operations by
American soldiers. After having assured the Congress and the public that
our military was trying to avoid combat, this could affect the entire policy
by embarrassing the ambassador and the State Department, the White
House, and supporters in Congress.
Keeping it secret would have been harder than it seems. Dozens of
Salvadoran personnel, over whom we had no authority, knew of the
incident. Some of them had probably been planted on the Salvadoran
military by the FMLN. No one wanted them to announce the incident.
The country was crawling with journalists. For U.S. news media,
El Salvador was hottest international story. All major U.S. media
maintained offices in El Salvador. Not just CBS, NBC, ABC, and CNN,
but AP, UPI, National Public Radio, The New York Times, The
Washington Post, Time, and Newsweek kept correspondents there. Many
other news organizations, such as The Wall Street Journal, The Chicago
Tribune, The Dallas Morning News, and the Los Angeles Times spent
weeks at a time staffing El Salvador. The Salvadoran elections in 1982
drew about 1,500 foreign journalists on top of those always present. There
were no legal constraints on their movements or contacts. Members of the
embassy staff encountered journalists in every part of the country, and
many journalists embedded themselves with the insurgents for days on end.
Journalists also had wide-ranging contacts in the Salvadoran government
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and could count on hearing from fellow correspondents at the State
Department, the Pentagon, and other bureaus around the world.
These mostly forgotten incidents raise interesting issues:





Does any element of the U.S. government owe a straight answer to
a reporter who shows evidence of bringing bias to a story?
What about a friendly reporter?
What were the options for the MILGRP exec?
What would have happened had he originally come clean with the
PAO?

In the charged atmosphere of the time, critics of the policy might
have claimed that shooting back showed the inevitability of U.S. personnel
becoming involved in combat and drawn into someone else’s war.
Panicked bureaucrats in Washington might have demanded even tighter
restrictions on where trainers could operate. The lack of flexibility would
have reduced the effectiveness of the meeting.

55

HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s

VII. With Friends Like These
Everyone assigned to El Salvador, civilian or military, shook
bloodstained hands. Sometimes they knew who was a murderer;
sometimes they did not. Knowing just how to react was not easy. Further
complicating the matter was that individuals seemed to change their
behavior with the passage of time. In 1980 and 1981, things were
especially violent and, as noted above, the period between Ronald
Reagan’s election and inauguration was shockingly violent. From 1981
through the end of 1983, murders58 were still absurdly high—about 250
death squad killings monthly.
On December 11, 1983, Vice President George H. Bush visited El
Salvador for several hours on his return from a visit to Argentina. He met
with the Salvadoran High Command and showed them a letter from
President Reagan. The vice president did not leave a copy of the letter, and
it has not been published. Even so, it is widely known that the letter
specified steps the Salvadoran military and government must take to curb
death squad violence. Death squad activity dropped precipitously, as did
reports of army massacres. In spite of sporadic outrages, death squad
murders never again reached the levels of 1982 and 1983.

A. The Nuns
Colonel Eugenio Vides Casanova was commander of the
Salvadoran National Guard when the four American churchwomen were
raped and murdered by junior59 enlisted Guardsmen. Not long after the
investigation began, it became clear that the women had been followed
from the airport and murdered well before they got to the city. The

58
59

As distinct from legitimate combat deaths.
The most senior was a sub-sergeant.
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embassy quickly determined that the National Guard was organizationally
responsible for security at the airport and its environs.
Nor was the nuns’ case the only black mark on the National Guard
while it was under Colonel Vides’s command. The intelligence section of
the National Guard was known to the U.S. to be, in effect, a death squad60
financed by wealthy Salvadorans who bankrolled multiple murders,
including the “Sheraton murders,” discussed below.
When the individuals were identified and the U.S. asked for their
weapons, the National Guard initially tried to play a shell game with their
G-3 rifles. The game failed, and Colonel Vides became extraordinarily
helpful with the investigation. Eventually, he was promoted to general and
became defense minister. As time went on, those Americans who dealt
General Vides found him understanding and helpful. Uniquely among the
highest levels of the Salvadoran military, General Vides would privately
acknowledge that there was significant corruption in the officer corps and
that some officers were involved in death squads.
Immediately following the critical 1984 El Salvadoran presidential
elections, now Defense Minister Vides, with the rest of the high command
lined up behind him, announced that the military stood 100 percent behind
the official results—even though it was widely known that winner José
Napoleón Duarte stood to the left of most officers. Vides put it this way in
a nationally televised address when he said (approximately): This is not a
game of cards where, if you do not like your cards, you can ask for a new
deal. We in the Army have put up the blood for these elections and they
will stand.

60

The Mano Blanco
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Discussion Questions
 Did Defense Minister Vides come to recognize that there was a
better way? That continuous, rampant human rights abuses
strengthened the rebels?
 At what point does a person, having failed to lead with integrity,
become trustworthy?
 Was Vides simply clever enough to tell the Americans what they
wanted to hear?
 Did the U.S. have any choice in this matter?
 Could we have demanded a different defense minister?
 Would it have mattered if we had?

B. The El Mozote Massacre
The Atlacatl Battalion, trained and equipped by the United States
and stood up as an “Immediate Reaction Battalion,” was a fierce combat
unit. But under its first commander, it was responsible for a major war
crime.
In late 1981, the Atlacatl Battalion, operating under the command
of Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa, murdered about a thousand people,
mostly women and children, in the northern town of El Mozote. The
massacre has been investigated many times, and there is little doubt of its
scope or the battalion’s responsibility.61
About three years after El Mozote, Monterrosa was promoted to
colonel and given command of the eastern third of the country, the area
where guerrilla concentrations were highest and where most of the battles
took place. It was hard to believe this man was the author of El Mozote.
“The Report of the Truth Commission to the United Nations” of March 15, 1993 cites
then Battalion Commander LTC Domingo Monterrosa Barrios as one of those
responsible. The Truth Commission puts the number of those murdered as “over 200.”
61
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His troops routinely passed out soccer balls to kids in villages.
When he entered a village, he spoke of the guerrillas not as “communist
terrorists” as did most of his fellow officers, but as “errant brothers.” He
took prisoners and treated them well. He was eventually killed when the
FMLN set a very clever trap for him.

Discussion Questions
 How should Americans respond to Monterrosa, the war criminal?
 How should they respond to Monterrosa, the savvy commander
who respected the populace?

C. The Las Hojas Massacre
In early 1983, Colonel Elmer Gonzalez Araujo ordered the
battalion he commanded to massacre the inhabitants of Las Hojas, an
indigenous agricultural commune in a very quiet area of the country. This
massacre had nothing to with the ongoing war. Colonel Gonzalez was paid
by a nearby rancher to take revenge on villagers who objected to having
cattle driven across their crops. According to U.S. Embassy Human Rights
Officer Eduardo Baez,62 up to 74 people were murdered with close-range
shots to the head. Gonzales, along with all those charged, was cleared of
all wrongdoing.
Colonel Gonzalez was removed from troop command and made
chief of procurement for the Salvadoran Army. In that position, he
conspired with three American businessmen to repackage expired
Yugoslav ammunition as U.S.-manufactured in order to make it eligible
for purchase as military assistance. The ruse was discovered when some of
the ammunition failed in combat. He was never charged for the murders or
for corruption.
62

Direct conversation with the author on the day of the event.
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Discussion Questions
 Should the U.S. have made representations to the Salvadorans
demanding that Col. Gonzalez be prosecuted for the murders?
 Would such demands have been honored?
 How do you keep working with Salvadoran officers who worked
against the prosecution of Col. Gonzalez—even after his corrupt
procurements led directly to the deaths of Salvadoran soldiers?

D. The Sheraton Murders
The Sheraton murders stand as a signal event in El Salvador’s war.
These murders, of two Americans and one Salvadoran, illuminate much of
the country’s dark side. This single case involves death squads, military
officers directly involved in cold-blooded murder, and the impunity from
prosecution of military personnel and their collaborators for even the most
dreadful crimes. The case reveals political interference with the judicial
process, the intimidation of witnesses, and the refusal of the military, upon
whom we were spending about a half-million dollars every day, to yield to
U.S. pressure.
Two American military officers played significant roles in solving
the murders.
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2337 Saturday 3 January 1981
Salon Las Americas, Hotel Sheraton
San Salvador, El Salvador63
Three men sat alone in the dining room in the Sheraton Hotel.
Mark Pearlman and Michael Hammer64 were American attorneys working
for the American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD). They
were guests at the Sheraton and were finishing dinner with José Viera,
president of the Salvadoran agrarian reform institute. All were involved in
implementing the largest agrarian reform in the history of Central America.
The first phase of the reform had been implemented, with huge chunks of
the largest estates in the small country turned over to the peasants who had
worked the land.
At the entrance to the restaurant, a tall, pale, blond man with wavy
hair pointed at the three and gestured with his head. Seconds later, two
men dressed in windbreakers came in and pulled two Ingram machine
pistols, one 9 mm, the other .45 caliber. They opened fire on the three and
hit all of them multiple times. Pearlman crawled away from the table. One
gunman stood astride him and fired a burst to his head. Amazingly, the
bullets missed, but Pearlman died en route to the hospital.
The U.S. government knew a great deal about the Sheraton
murders from the beginning. Salvadoran Captain Ernesto Ávila Ávila,
who had secured the weapons, got very drunk after the murders and told
the whole story to a U.S. military officer assigned to the MILGRP. That
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Unless otherwise noted, all information about the Sheraton murders is drawn from (but
not a quote of) the unclassified “Case Impression Memorandum” prepared by A. Carlos
Correa (undated, but prepared in early 1984). Correa was a Justice Department prosecutor
detailed to the embassy in San Salvador to follow the judicial processes concerning the
death of U.S. citizens there. He provided the author with a copy of the memorandum in
May 2013.
64
On June 21, 2013, President Barack Obama nominated Michael Hammer’s son, also
Michael Hammer, to be U.S. ambassador to Chile.
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officer reported the information through channels straightaway. With the
basic story understood, things started to clarify very quickly.
By May 1981, a U.S. government agency was reporting details
about those at the heart of the conspiracy. In a cable dated 30 May 1981,65
the agency reported:
Responsibility of “death squad” run by businessman
Ricardo Sol Mesa and National Guard Major Dennis Moran for
murders of Rodolfo Viera and U.S. citizens Michael Hammer and
Mark Pearlman; use of the death squad to conduct bombings in
San Salvador. [redacted]
1. A mid-level National Guard Officer [redacted] said on
27 May 1981 that Moran directed a “death squad” payrolled by
Salvadoran businessman Ricardo Sol Mesa, and that Sol Mesa
and Moran used this death squad to kill Rodolfo Viera, former
head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute (ISTA) at the
Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador on 4 January 1981. [redacted]
(Comment: U.S. citizens Mike Hammer and Mark Pearlman of
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)
were killed along with Viera because they happened to be with
Viera at the time and because they supported Viera’s agrarian
reform activities. Hammer and Pearlman apparently were not
targets in their own right.)
2. Viera was a longstanding target of the Sol Mesa and
Moran group, and they took advantage of his lengthy presence in
the Sheraton Hotel for dinner on 4 January to assassinate him.
The assassination was not preplanned; the decision to murder
Viera was made on the spur of the moment.
3. The death squad described above is responsible for the
majority of bank bombings that have taken place in recent
65

Approved for release with excisions in November 1993.
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months in the capital city of San Salvador, as well as for the
assassinations of many individuals thought to support leftist
causes. The payroll of the death squad is estimated 20,000
colones monthly (U.S. $8,000): with members normally paid 100
colones daily (U.S. $40) during the periods they are assigned to
work for the squad. [redacted] (Comment: Although not directly
stated it is believed that the majority if not all members of the Sol
Mesa and Moran death squad are members of the National
Guard.)
4. The Sol Mesa and Moran death squad operates on its
own but is thought to have connections through former Army
Captain Eduardo Alfonso Avila with another rightist group which
is involved in similar activities.

The first officer’s information was verified through another U.S.
military officer and his wife. The chain of events that led to this
confirmation began with a phone call from the Contadora Island Resort to
the U.S. Embassy in Panama on May 8, 1982. The resort said a U.S.
diplomat staying there had attempted to kill himself with an overdose. It
turned out that the individual in question was not an American, but a
Salvadoran military attaché assigned to Costa Rica—Captain Ávila. By
coincidence, the American Defense Attaché (DATT) in Panama had
known Ávila since 1977, when the attaché was assigned to San Salvador
and Ávila worked at the Salvadoran general staff. The American attaché
took Ávila, who was in distress and seemed to be having some kind of
nervous breakdown, into his home.
Over May 8 and 9, Ávila told the attaché’s wife the story of what
had happened at the Sheraton. (He would not discuss this with the DATT
present.) The account was rambling and disjointed, but confirmed what
Ávila had said right after the murders. Ávila’s admissions and statements
were quickly reported through interagency channels.
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The actual shooters were two enlisted men from the Salvadoran
National Guard. Major Mario Denís Morán, chief of Section 2
(intelligence) of the Guard, was present. Lieutenant Rodolfo Isidro López
Sibrián gave the orders to the triggermen. Ricardo Sol Meza, an afectado,
a principal owner of the Sheraton whose land had been confiscated for
land reform, was present, as was his brother-in-law, Hans Christ, also an
afectado.66 Christ fingered the three victims. Captain Ernesto Ávila Ávila,
who was AWOL from his post in Costa Rica, retrieved the Ingram
machine pistols from the National Guard’s armory.
American military officers had certainly done their job in passing
information along. Even so, the combined efforts of the U.S. Departments
of State, Defense, and Justice have never been able to get at any of the
intellectual authors of these murders. The peace treaty that ended the war
included an amnesty that put them beyond the reach of the legal system.
This case is simple and straightforward. Powerful individuals often
operating in the open got away with a very public murder of two
American citizens and a prominent official of their own country.
Here is a lesson to write on the palm of your hand: Military and
economic assistance usually buy you cordiality, but often fail to give you
leverage.
There are plenty of examples, but four words will serve for the
moment: Israeli settlements; Hamid Kharzai.

E. The Jesuit Murders
6 PRIESTS, 2 OTHERS SLAIN IN SAN SALVADOR
FIGHTING INTENSIFIES FOR CONTROL OF CAPITAL

66

A Salvadoran told that author in the spring of 1984 that Christ, with whom he had gone
to the American School, had been expelled from the American School for painting antiSemitic slogans on the lockers of Jewish students.
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By Lee Hockstader and Douglas Farah67
SAN SALVADOR, NOV. 16—Six prominent Jesuit priests,
including the rector and vice rector of El Salvador’s most
prestigious university, were killed early today along with two other
persons at the house where they slept in the capital.
At least two U.S. Army officers knew who did it and sat on the
information before reporting it to their chain of command.68
On November 16, 1989, some four days into another a final
offensive in El Salvador, six Jesuit priests were murdered, along with their
maid and her daughter, at their home on the University of Central America
(UCA) campus. The story was front-page news worldwide. The murders
led the news on all U.S. broadcast networks and on CNN. People with
even passing knowledge of events in San Salvador suspected the right.
UCA Rector Ignacio Ellacuría, one of those murdered, had been critical of
the Salvadoran government and military and spoken and written of the
FMLN and FDR in sympathetic terms. He was known to many foreign
journalists and to some present and past officers of the U.S. Embassy. The
U.S. government and the Salvadoran government, including President
Alfredo Cristiani, feared blame would attach to the Salvadoran military or
the government at an unusually sensitive time:



El Salvador’s president was seeking legitimacy for himself and his
party.
Cristiani was the first president from the Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (Republican Nationalist Alliance, or ARENA).69

Lee Hockstader and Douglas Farah, “6 Priest, 2 Others Slain in San Salvador,”
Washington Post Foreign Service, November 17, 1989, p. A01.
68
Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this account has been verified by
William J. Dieterich, who was Chargé d’ Affaires, a.i. at the U.S. Embassy in San
Salvador at the time of the events.
67
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Many considered ARENA to be a front for the death squads. Party
founder Roberto D’Aubuisson, widely considered to be “Mr. Death
Squad,” had been its first presidential candidate. The party had
specifically selected Cristiani as its candidate because he was
financially and politically conservative, but not linked to rights
abuses. Cristiani wanted to polish his party’s and his country’s
image on human rights.
The Cold War was ending. The Soviet bloc was crumbling; the
Berlin Wall had come down exactly one week before the murders.
No one knew what this would mean for El Salvador, which all
understood to be, at least in part, a proxy war between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union. The Cold War was ending and that could end
outside arms support for the government and the rebels.
Peace talks had begun. The first direct talks between the
Salvadoran government and the FMLN had opened in Mexico City
in September. There was promise here of a genuine negotiated
settlement—but the murder of the Jesuits might well kill the peace
talks.

There was nothing solid at first, but the assumption that
Salvadoran military or police forces were involved was widespread. The
government was reaching out around the world for ideas on how to
respond to worldwide outrage.70
In Spanish, arena means “sand,” which refers back to the original Latin and survives in
English as a place where sand is figuratively, and sometimes literally, spread.
70
The Salvadoran press attaché in Washington called the author of this paper. The attaché
had left El Salvador over three years before and was then press secretary to Drug Czar
William J. Bennett. The attaché told the author that he was calling on instructions from
President Cristiani, relayed through Salvadoran Ambassador Miguel Salaverría, to ask
what the government should say. The author’s advice was twofold: (1) Do not deny that
your armed forces are responsible. They may be. If they are, the civilian government then
looks complicit; and (2) seek (and publicly announce that you are seeking) detailed
outside investigation by a foreign country other than the U.S. The U.S. is too close to El
69
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In mid-December, Salvadoran Army Colonel Carlos Avilés, who
had been well and favorably known to U.S. embassy officers for many
years, privately told a U.S. Army major that the priests were killed by a
small group from the Salvadoran Army’s Atlacatl Battalion.71
The major knew, he had to know, that he was holding explosive
information—information that could end U.S. assistance to El Salvador
and give fresh impetus to the FMLN. There was really no way to gauge
what might happen if the Salvadoran Army were found to have committed
these murders. Salvador might become a new Cuba. Ten years of battles
between two administrations and five Congresses might be rendered moot.
On January 2, 1990, the major reported to his boss, the MILGRP
commander, a U.S. Army colonel. Even more than the major, the
MILGRP commander had to know the potential impact of this information.
The colonel reported directly to the U.S. ambassador and met with him
several times weekly. He had one-on-one access to the ambassador
whenever he wished.
The MILGRP commander’s options included, but were not limited
to, the following:


Report this information immediately to Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.
William J. Dieterich—the senior U.S. official in El Salvador.
(Ambassador William Walker was not in El Salvador.) As Chargé,
Dieterich had extensive authority over every individual in every
U.S. executive-branch agency in the country. Dieterich thus was
the MILGRP commander’s lawful and immediate superior.
Reporting this information to Chargé Dieterich would have meant
an immediate report to the State Department. Regardless of the

Salvador and if it finds the Government of El Salvador or the military blameless, no one
would believe it.
71
There is another version of events suggesting that the major learned of the murders in
October 1989—some weeks before they occurred. The major is reported to have given
contradictory statements to the FBI about almost everything related to the case.
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channel in which Dieterich reported the information to State, the
National Security Council staff and quite possibly President
George H. Bush would know within hours. With information
rocketing around the executive branch, Congress and the media
would probably know within 24 hours.
Immediately report to and seek guidance from the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Southern Command. This would have skirted the
responsibility of informing the Chargé, but that loop would have
closed within the hour.
Inform an intelligence officer within the embassy. This might
permit quiet investigation and a considered response before the
whole world knew of this information.
Make discreet inquiries with the Salvadoran armed forces to gauge
the credibility of the major’s report.
Arrange to speak directly with Colonel Avilés to judge his
credibility and learn something of his sources.

How did this play out in real life?
The immediate actual steps followed by the MILGRP commander
are not clear. It is certain that he did not report the information to the
Chargé d’Affaires, to Southcom, or to some intelligence officer in the
embassy.72 The MILGRP commander did, however, communicate the
information to Colonel René Emilio Ponce, chief of staff of the
Salvadoran armed forces.
The day after the major informed the MILGRP commander, there
was a meeting in Colonel Ponce’s office. Those present were Colonel
Ponce and Colonel Avilés, the American major and the commander of the
MILGRP, and perhaps one fairly junior State Department officer.
What happened at the meeting?

72

Telephone interview with Chargé d’Affaires William J. Dieterich, May 14, 2013.
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The essential story was repeated; Avilés told the American major
that the Atlacatl Battalion was responsible.
Avilés flatly denied that he had ever said a word to the American
major about the murders of the Jesuits.

Five days later, on Sunday, January 7, 1990, President Cristiani
announced that elements of the Salvadoran military were involved in the
murder of the Jesuits. He said a “Special Commission of Honor” had been
created to expose the truth about the murders in detail.
***
We have no idea why the MILGRP commander behaved as he did.
His actions put a confidential source’s life at risk. He totally ignored his
chain of command. His career could have ended right there. The Chargé
considered immediately relieving him of his command and ordering him
out of the country—he had the authority to do so. Had there been any
question about that authority, a phone call to Southcom would have
resolved the matter.
Only two individuals were ever convicted of the murders. In 1991,
Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, then commandant of El Salvador’s
military academy (sited in the same complex as the ministry of defense
and high command) was convicted of giving the orders. Lieutenant
Yuhssy René Mendoza, an officer in the Atlacatl Battalion, was convicted
for his participation. A civilian court sentenced the two to 30 years in
prison. The other seven, many of whom had acknowledged their roles,
were acquitted. The jury is thought to have freed them because they were
“following orders.” Benavides and Mendoza were set free on April 1,
1993 as a result of the amnesty law that was agreed to in the peace
agreement. They served less than two years for these mass murders.
What happened with the Jesuit murders? Why did two American
officers behave in such an unorthodox fashion?
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Consider the following questions:
 Why might the major have delayed reporting, even for a few days,
his information about the most notorious murders in the world?
 The MILGRP commander burned a favorably known source to an
organization he well knew capable of murder. Why?
 The MILGRP commander was born in El Salvador and knew his
way around Salvadoran society better than most Americans.
 Had he come to over-identify with the Salvadoran military?
 If you reach this conclusion, does a policy then have to be set that
limits the possible assignments of foreign-born personnel?
 Should the MILGRP commander have been relieved? By the State
Department? By U.S. Southern Command?
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VIII. Trust and Learning
Collectively and singularly, the actions of these counterpart
officers ranged from obstruction of justice to multiple murder to war
crimes. But these cases do not represent the first or last time we have
faced such issues. From the genocidal Joseph Stalin during World War II
to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s to various
figures in Afghanistan today, the U.S. government has sent military and
civilian personnel out to find a way to work with awful people. Sometimes
our unsavory friends move up to a higher standard, sometimes they never
get better, and sometimes they improve for a while and then go back to
their old ways.
What may make El Salvador a bit more poignant is its relatively
small scale. Anyone assigned to the U.S. Embassy, military or civilian,
had a fair chance of meeting some or all of the people involved in the
above actions. Some of them, like General Vides Casanova and Colonel
Monterrosa, were charming and seemed to move in the right direction as
we spent more time with them. Others never displayed any redeeming
qualities.
How do you learn who is trustworthy? How do you trust someone
who has ordered the murder of a thousand people? Covered up a
massacre? Helped a fellow officer evade justice?

A. A War in (and Sometimes With) the Media
In popular memory, the American people were united as never
before during “Good War,” World War II, the one fought by what reporter
Tom Brokaw called “the Greatest Generation.” There had been no
question about going to war: Japan had attacked us and then declared war
(although the ex post facto declaration arose from error and not malice);
Hitler declared war on us. We were in it, and Rosie the Riveter stood sideby-side with John Wayne, big business, and everyone else. And yes, the
71
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media were in it too, and there is no doubt about whose side they were on.
War correspondents wore American military uniforms and, when attached
to the troops, were subject to military law. The media submitted to
military censorship with little complaint. Some scandals were reported and
military officials criticized (think of Patton slapping the soldier73). Other
disasters were known to the media, but never until much later—as when
German E-boats slaughtered U.S. troops training for the invasion at
Normandy.74
Vietnam changed all that. Even when the U.S. presence was very
small, the frictions between the media and first the military and then the
broader government started to show. Why? What was different?




To begin with, there was no real argument about the need to fight
World War II. Japan hit us with a sneak attack. Hitler declared war
on us. The stakes and the sides were clear.
Vietnam was fuzzier. Americans were concerned about communist
expansion, and Munich had taught us that concession to dictators
just made things worse.75 Even so, Vietnam was a long way away
from the United States. Then, as now, most Americans could not
find it on a map.

73

During the last days of the campaign in Sicily in 1943, then-Lt. Gen. George S. Patton
slapped a hospitalized soldier. The incident drew national attention and to some extent
overshadowed Patton’s fine leadership. General Eisenhower reprimanded Patton and
ordered him to apologize to 7th Army troops. Richard Sommers (ed.), Vignettes of
Military History, Vol. III (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute,
February 1982).
74
In the early morning hours of April 28, 1944, German E-boats operating from France
attacked LSTs practicing for D Day (Operation Tiger) and killed 198 Navy and 441
Army personnel. Because the incident could have revealed D Day plans, it was not
reported until August 1944. Stars and Stripes [European Edition] 4, no. 237 (7 Aug.
1944).
75
In 1938, France and Britain reneged on a commitment to Czechoslovakia, permitting
Hitler to seize much of that country and its arms works. British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlin negotiated this agreement in Munich; explaining his cave-in, he told the
British people that the Czechs were “a faraway people of whom we know little.”
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Reporters on the ground in Vietnam were speaking to field and
company-grade officers. Their journalistic reports were about a
different war than the one the generals were briefing in Saigon and
Washington. Not only were these young journalists reporting a
different war, they were also highlighting the differences between
what they saw and heard and what the brass was saying.
At one point, the national security establishment was so frustrated
with the reporting of New York Times correspondent David
Halberstam that President Kennedy called Times publisher Arthur
Ochs “Punch” Sulzberger to the White House. The president
demanded that Halberstam be pulled from Vietnam. President
Kennedy’s demand backfired. Sulzberger instead cancelled
Halberstam’s upcoming vacation. He did not want Halberstam’s
departure on vacation to be taken by the president as a sign that the
Times had caved to him.76
In 1966, Harrison E. Salisbury, a distinguished journalist with a
solid record of objectivity, went to North Vietnam. The essence of
his reports was that bombing in the North caused terrible damage,
but did not harm the communist government’s will or ability to
fight.77 The Johnson administration and President Johnson himself
were furious, as were many on the American right.
As the war progressed, the Nixon administration joined its two
predecessors in laying the blame for declining public support on
the media. In 1977’s two-volume The Big Story, Peter Braestrup
argued that media preconceptions and prejudices tainted reporting

Jones, Alex, “The Best of Times,” blog post, The New Yorker, September 29, 2012,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/09/the-best-of-times.html; and
Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social
and Military History, p. 446 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
77
No Americans reported from Berlin during World War I, Berlin, or Tokyo during
World War II, or from wherever the North Koreans happened to be during the Korean
War.
76
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on the psychologically and politically critical Tet Offensive of
1968.78 Braestrup’s book argued that the U.S. government was
telling the truth when it said that Tet had been a crushing defeat for
the communist Viet Cong. As Braestrup explained it, the tainted
reporting caused both supporters and opponents of the war in the
U.S. to regard it as a defeat and played a major role in reducing
support for the war. Braestrup’s book remains well respected by
all—including many of the correspondents he blamed for alarmist
reporting.
As things went on, the military kept telling the politicans that we
were winning, and the media kept telling the American people that
we were losing. That the military establishment came to mistrust,
even hate, the media was not just unsurprising—it was inevitable.

To put it simplistically, after the war was lost, liberals mused about
how Kennedy might have pulled out after the 1964 election and griped
that the Johnson administration’s false account of the Gulf of Tonkin
incident79 had led us into a war we could not win. Conservatives spoke of
how the media and left-wing politicians kept the United States from
prevailing in a war that was completely winnable. After all, we were not
defeated on the battlefield.80
78

Braestrup, Peter, The Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and
Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1977).
79
We now know this was no incident at all. The Navy reported that U.S. ships had been
attacked by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin. This purported attack led
President Johnson to ask permission to expand the war in response. Congress gave him
that permission with the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,” which became the legislative basis
for the war. Almost all serious historians of the period agree there was no such attack. It
is not clear if Johnson knew the report was at best wildly exaggerated.
80
This paragraph, like the preceding one, is but a sketch of arguments often more
nuanced and thoughtful than put forward here. Nevertheless, I believe that left and right
may be fairly described as making their arguments align with these rhetorical stick
figures.
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By 1981, the U.S. military was again finding its way following the
decade-plus of debacle in Vietnam. The military did find its way, but was
nearly unanimous in declaring that journalists were prejudiced against it
and that nothing good would come from dealing with them.

B. Quivering Before the Camera
The March 10, 1981 New York Times story “U.S. Advisers Taking
Care in El Salvador” began: “The military advisers here live cautiously,
avoiding publicity with almost as much care as they avoid the Marxist
guerrillas who might want to shoot them.”81
The article describes how a group of “several hundred journalists”
had been “hounding them for pictures and interviews.” In an effort to
satisfy the constant pressure from the media and demystify the U.S.
presence, the embassy set up a press conference to expose some of the
trainers to the press.
The article described the encounter:
At a news conference arranged by the United States Embassy
today, one adviser, a helicopter maintenance instructor, said:
“What makes you nervous—and I'll be honest with you guys—is
the press. We have more problems with the press than with these
people we are supposed to be aware of.” …
The two officers who met with the press today at Ilopango Air
Force Base on the outskirts of San Salvador declined to give their
names, ages, or places of birth or to speak of their families.
The story went on to report:
Schumacher, Edward, “U.S. Advisers Taking Care in El Salvador,” New York Times,
March 10, 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/10/world/us-advisers-taking-care-inel-salvador.html.
81
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they always carry a pistol. Their orders are not to get involved in
any combat, but they are authorized to shoot in self-defense or to
protect a fellow adviser.
This odd little story makes the maintenance instructor look
somewhat silly, but the story and his press statements accurately reflect
two military preoccupations: (1) No one was to have any reason to believe
our personnel were going into combat; and (2) nothing good could come
from dealing with the media.

C. Embrace the Hacks82
This apprehension and mistrust of the press continued for the better
part of a year. Things finally turned for the better with the arrival of
MILGRP Commander Colonel John D. Waghelstein, a Special Forces
officer who never served a tour in the Pentagon and had very limited
experience in other branches or disciplines. In the following section, Col.
Waghelstein, a faculty member of the U.S. Naval War College since his
retirement from the Army, describes how he came to grips with the
MILGRP’s morbid fear of the media.
“Full Contact Media Relations,” by Col. John Waghelstein
Prior to my assumption of command of the U.S. Military Group in
El Salvador, I spent a month at Monterrey’s Presidio (U.S. Army language
school). In addition to brushing up on my Spanish, I had an opportunity to
82

Eventually, the media and the embassy press officers were on good enough terms with
one another to turn normally pejorative terms into ironic terms of endearment. Press
office “flaks,” slang for a PR person whose job is to keep journalists away from facts (or
at least principals), and “hacks” (taken from “hack writer”) began openly using the terms
in one another’s presence in a friendly way.

76

HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s

read the press coverage, both Latino and American. I was struck by just
how bad the situation appeared in the press. The embassy traffic was more
optimistic, but not by much.
It seemed to me that press relations were not just a matter of
making the Salvadoran Army, the U.S. Army, or President Reagan, or
anyone look good. This was a substantive issue and had to be addressed as
such. The American people, the Congress, and much of the administration
took their understanding of El Salvador from the media. With clear
skepticism about administration policy afoot, getting a fair shake from the
press was of major importance.
My brothers-in-arms did not universally accept my view on this
matter. Upon arrival I had a brief exchange with the outgoing MILGRP
commander who, when asked about his relations with the press,
responded, “I don’t talk to those bastards, they’re all a bunch of
communists….”
About a week after taking command, I got a request from the
outgoing embassy public affairs officer. Would I consent to an interview
by a Christian Science Monitor correspondent whom I knew from
Vietnam? For the price of lunch, I consented, with the caveat that anything
I said was on background and not for attribution.
The word got out that I would talk to the press, and my dance card
quickly filled. Because the care and feeding of the Fourth Estate was not
my primary function, some management was required. Don Hamilton, the
new embassy public affairs officer, solved the problem with a once-aweek session for as many non-Salvadoran media as wished to come.
They could ask anything they wished, but by ground rules, I could
be identified as a “foreign military observer” or a “western observer,”83

This coyness had its purpose. Of course the Salvadorans knew I was the “observer.”
But if they were not confronted with the fact that an American officer was making the
comments, they would not have to demand an explanation of us. –J.W.
83
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but not both. While any question could be asked, not all would be
answered. I made it very clear that I would not answer questions about
intelligence or current Salvadoran operations. These weekly
backgrounders continued for the remaining 18 months of my tour and,
from what I understand, through the tours of at least the next two
MILGRP commanders.
There were a number of concerns that occupied our efforts to
support the El Salvadorans. The human rights issue was by far the most
vexing. The issues were real and horrifying and there was ample reason to
believe that the amorphous blobs referred to as “the right” and “the death
squads” were responsible for much of the damage. Beyond that, there
were obvious if not specific overlaps between the military and the security
forces84 and the “death squads.” The military’s 50-year human rights
record inspired no confidence. No military officer had ever been convicted
of a human rights violation or other serious crime.
There were plenty in Washington in and out of government who
believed the whole effort to save the Salvadoran government85 was bad
policy and immoral to boot. Our security assistance was specifically and
generally linked to human rights.
I knew I could not “brief away” the human rights issues. Nor could
I “win over” the press. There would have to be palpable improvement for
that to happen. At a minimum, the death squad count, which had fallen to
about 250 monthly from its October 1980 high of 750, could not rise
again.
But even as we waited for further improvement on human rights, I
resolutely believed that we could tamp down fears that the U.S. was
beginning another Vietnam with a handful of “advisors” who would
84

All the different police, paramilitary, and military (National Police, Treasury Police,
National Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force, and even the Fire Department) were led from
the same pool of military school graduates. –J.W.
85
The junta was replaced by an elected Constituent Assembly as I arrived in country in
1982. –J.W.
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eventually become combatants. If we could clear that hurdle, we could
have a basis for more balanced reporting.
Our first break in the advisor/combatant issue came when the PAO
told me that LIFE was eager for a story, with photos, on the trainers. At
that time, LIFE was still a monthly magazine that covered news and had
an important audience. The PAO and I talked it over, vetted it with the
embassy front office, and set it up.
The conditions were simple. No current or intelligence operations.
Access would be limited to coverage of a SEAL Mobile Training Team
(MTT) working with the Salvadoran Marine Commandos in Usulután
Department and to a Special Forces MTT training the El Salvadoran
Airborne unit at the Air Force Base at Ilopango.
My charge to officers and men in the MTTs was straightforward:
Tell the truth, but do not discuss current or future ops. Emphasis should be
on our mission as trainers, not advisers.
The headline alone justified the effort: “Tutors of War.” The
embassy and State Department loved it. My other boss, SOUTHCOM
Commanding General Wallace Nutting, viewed the article differently. I
received a heavily marked-up copy by courier noting the following sins in
red marker: One of the SEAL trainers was reported as saying one of the El
Salvadoran troops he was working with was not the smartest; one of the
photos showed one of the SEALs carrying a handgun in his belt; one of
the Special Forces NCOs was photographed in a T-shirt, not wearing his
uniform jacket.
An Army general was not the only one with heartburn. My
executive officer, SEAL Lt. Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, who
loved the assignment and had already been approved for an extension,
received the following letter from his detailer:
Mar 4 1983
Dear Al,
I’m writing to discuss two subjects. One is personal, the
other (albeit related) is professional.
79

HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s

Let me begin by saying that I felt the article you and Petty
Officer G.L. Stubblefie allowed to be written in Life Magazine is
the most damaging written item against the community since the
Washington Post article in 1978. Even worse, it may result in
SEALs being removed from El Salvador and damage our
continued presence in Central America. It was exactly the kind of
article our liberal public needs to use as ammunition to get us out
of that country. It also shows why the SF’s should replace us as the
sole advisors. At least they wear uniforms, have regulation on
military appearance standards, don’t degrade their counterparts,
and don’t parade sidearms openly & dangerously like a Saigon
Cowboy. You have both been compromised. IF you were any kind
of target before, you are a bigger one now.
This has already resulted in further degradation of our
efforts in that a Senator came on the 11:00 Niteline commentary 1
March 1983 to berate SEALs in El Salvador. I’m sure there is
more to come.
My second reason for writing is to let you know that I am
in the process of attempting to line up a relief for you as quickly as
possible. I intend to program the first qualified individual available
to come through the training pipeline into your position. Your
original PRD is still August 1983, but it will likely slip to a later
date. As soon as an individual is identified, we will notify the
replacement officer to run through the chain for approval.
Regards,
Signed
G.L. Stubblefied
Lcdr
USN
Special Warfare Assignment
When Al came to me with that bit of news, I decided I needed to
do what I could to prevent his forced relief. The first consideration was
that he was a fine officer making an outsized contribution. He was trusted
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by and popular with the Country Team86 and with his Salvadoran
counterparts. His extension would provide continuity after I rotated out in
June. The other part of the equation was that I thought Al was getting a
raw deal. He did not dream up this article and certainly did not “allow” it
to be published in LIFE.
Given a sense that a personal and professional error was in train
and that I was absolutely furious, I did what any self-righteous hot head
would do. I jumped channels and wrote a letter to someone with the
authority to help:
16 March 1983
Admiral James D. Watkins
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D.C. 20350
Dear Admiral Watkins:
LCDR Schaufelberger shared the enclosed March 4 letter
with me as it deals with a possible curtailment of his tour. I find
the letter erroneous both in fact and conclusion. While all Special
Forces troops shown in the LIFE magazine are in uniform, it is by
no means true that they “wear uniforms having regulation military
appearance standards and they don’t parade their sidearms
openly…” The only time military personnel under my command
wear uniforms is when they are in large numbers working with
large groups of Salvadoran trainees. In San Salvador we all wear
civilian clothes. When they are in small groups outside the capital
it becomes a judgment call depending on training areas, population
86

The Country Team consists of the ambassador, DCM, all State Department section
chiefs, and the heads of all other agencies at post. The team meets at least weekly.
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density, type of training, and the threat. This applies to SEALs as
well as soldiers. Nothing would compromise personnel faster than
appearing in U.S. uniform in La Union or any other town. The
same applies to “regulation military appearance.” It was with some
reluctance and at the specific urging of the Regional Security
Officer that I gave up my “high and tight,” “airborne” haircut and
allowed my hair to grow to a less conspicuous length. As for
parading side arms openly, there is nothing conspicuous about that
here in the capital, much less in a departmental capital that hosts a
military base.
Then there is the matter of conclusions. While the Navy
Military Personnel Command Staff may find the LIFE magazine
article “the most damaging written item against the community
since 1978,” the consensus of this mission is that it has been
helpful to our efforts in El Salvador. The article had its genesis in
the contacts between our PAO and the associate editor of LIFE
magazine. The idea was then approved by me and had the full
knowledge and consent of the Ambassador.
The Ambassador and his deputy and the PAO monitor the
coverage of El Salvador in all major U.S. news organs. It is their
opinion as well as mine that the LIFE article was positive and
helped further public understanding of our policies in El Salvador.
Our PAO, whose judgment I respect since he has served in
Public Affairs at six overseas missions, ranging through
Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy, three overseas presidential visits,
and the Sinai Field Mission, has explained to me that even if you
can persuade a reputable publication to print something entirely
favorable on a controversial topic, the effect is to make readers
somewhat suspicious. Yes, some of our trainers are quoted making
remarks that are a bit embarrassing, but that is the price you pay
for giving journalists access to individuals. From the point of view
of our mission in El Salvador one thing was made very clear: Our
trainers do not go on combat missions. Especially in the aftermath
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of the wounding of SSGT Stanley87 this is a message we are most
happy to get across.
As for the Senator’s report on the ABC Late Evening News,
it concerns us very little. He is no friend of our policy here and
those are the licks we have come to expect. Had it not been for the
LIFE article it would have been another issue. Our PAO has
already taken Chris Whipple88 to task for having said that trainers
are “much closer to combat” than was generally supposed. When
the PAO pointed out to Whipple that everyone, including the PAO,
Vice Consuls, and our secretaries are much closer to combat than
was generally understood, Whipple readily conceded that he
should have said just that and has promised that in any future
comment he might make on the subject he will make that clear.
From the general tone of the letter, it sounds like someone
is expecting something more like an “All Hands” article. Those of
us in daily contact with a vigorous, inquisitive corps of
professional journalists know and understand what is possible and
what is not. My Ambassador is not upset, the Deputy Chief of
Mission is not upset, the PAO is not upset, and most importantly
for LCDR Schaufelberger, I am not upset. Given that the
individuals most directly concerned with and most closely
monitoring press coverage of El Salvador (and the military trainers
here) believe the article to have been a plus for U.S. policy, I am a
little surprised that the Naval Military Personnel Command is so
excited.
I find LCDR Schaufelberger to be a dedicated and capable
officer and I maxed his last fitness report to reflect my satisfaction
with his performance. In view of his valuable contributions to our
mission here, I recommend that he be permitted to stay as long as
87
88

Noted elsewhere
Author of the story in LIFE
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he wishes. He was given a verbal OK by his detailer for a one-year
extension prior to the LIFE magazine article. I would appreciate
your taking a hand in this matter.
(Signed)
JOHN D. WAGHELSTEIN
COL, Inf Commanding

In due course, I received a nice response:
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
25 April 1983
Dear Colonel Waghelstein,
Admiral G.L. Stubblefie asked that I respond to your recent
letter to him concerning Lieutenant Commander A.A.
Schaufelberger, USN. The letter by Lieutenant Commander
Stubblefield contained his personal views about the contents of the
LIFE magazine article. His concerns were made as a member of
the Naval Special Warfare community and should more
appropriately have been made in a separate personal letter; he has
been so counseled.
As previously agreed upon between Lieutenant
Commander Schaufelberger and his detailer, his original rotation
date of August 1983 has been extended one year until August 1984.
He will be kept informed of his future assignment as well as plans
for his relief via the normal Navy channels. I appreciate the fine
work of you and your men.
With kindest regards.
The letter took five weeks to get back because the vice admiral
sent his mail through channels. I was pleased with the letter;
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SOUTHCOM’s General Nutting was fine with the contents but less
pleased with me. I had jumped channels and written a cheeky letter to a
four-star in another service. Although incensed, he came to recognize that
better-informed journalism advanced our efforts.
There was much more work to be done with the El Salvadoran
military’s relations with the media. An opening came when an NBC
television reporter asked to cover our training. An MTT working in nearby
San Juan Opico provided the opportunity. The base commander very
reluctantly agreed to allow NBC to cover our work.
His reluctance evaporated when he met correspondent Bonnie
Anderson. Bonnie, a former tennis professional on the Virginia Slims tour,
was blonde, tall, fit, attractive, and spoke flawless Spanish. The
Salvadoran base commander was smitten. He personally gave her the
grand tour and as much time and access as she and her crew wanted. In
addition to our trainers, Ms. Anderson’s crew filmed the commander’s
new clinic and focused on a locally developed prosthetic leg they were
using to outfit maimed soldiers.
The night the piece aired, the Salvadoran embassy in Washington,
alerted by the State Department, had their Betamax recorder rolling during
the NBC Nightly News. When the tape got to San Salvador, the Armed
Forces were shocked and pleased. Although they repeated mistakes with
the media, we began to see movement toward a more accommodating
ESAF. The assistant Chief of Staff was designated as spokesman when
they decided to give interviews to important journalists. Media access
improved, especially away from the capital.
Author’s Comment on Colonel Waghelstein’s Account
Colonel Waghelstein did more than accommodate the press. He
trained them. Most of them were too young for the draft, for Vietnam, and
knew as much about insurgency and irregular warfare as, to use one of his
favorite phrases, “a pig knows about Sunday.” Patiently, Waghelstein
walked the journalists through it:
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Most wars ended neither with the government delivering a
knockout punch to the insurgents nor with a guerrilla takeover. The
ends of most wars are negotiated.
The guerrillas have to be persuaded, almost always militarily, that
they cannot shoot their way into power. Only then are meaningful
negotiations and a political solution possible.
How do you know who is winning in a war without front lines?
Wars like this one are for “sergeants and lieutenants.”
The Salvadoran military wanted, but had limited use for, ground
attack aircraft and almost none for high-speed aircraft, armor, or
artillery.

This educational effort helped.
It personalized our military personnel. From these official but
informal contacts came invitations to social events, embassy-vs.journalists softball games, and personal friendships. This was not as hard
as it might seem. West Point might not be Yale, but our military and
diplomatic officers are not as different from journalists as some suppose.
Most came from the broad American middle class and attended the same
high schools, played on the same sports teams. If you took family portraits
of the military officers and the journalists right before high school
graduation, you probably could not tell the future officers from the future
correspondents. And both groups are bound by patriotism. Military
officers’ patriotism is on constant display, and their duty to country is a
sworn obligation. But journalists are patriots, too. Most of the journalists
who covered El Salvador have seen the world, seen it and examined it—
and they have come home to America. Friendly contacts are actually fairly
easy if you define patriotism more broadly and give people the benefit of
the doubt.
Yes, a handful of journalists regarded playing shortstop in a
softball games as derogation of the First Amendment; but then again,
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some official personnel regarded social contact with journalists as akin to
fraternizing with the enemy.

D. Shaming the Devil
Most of the foreign correspondents in El Salvador were American
citizens. This gave us an extra duty: The U.S. government, especially the
State Department, has a positive duty to try to protect American citizens
abroad. Most of the journalists rightly believed they knew how to take
care of themselves and that if they got in trouble their news organization
would help. This was true of the most experienced correspondents
working for the big news organizations. But greener correspondents or
those working for smaller and poorer media outlets often needed help,
especially when they felt threatened by the Salvadoran army. This
happened a few times a year. The public affairs officer usually let such
journalists stay at his well-guarded house and had his bodyguard and
driver take them to the airport so they could leave the country to “cool off”
for a few days. In one case, it was not the PAO, but the Naval Attaché, a
Marine lieutenant colonel, who took in a threatened journalist.
Cordial or formal, the concept that drove relations with the press
missionwide was straightforward: Tell the truth and shame the devil.
There was little chance of deceiving anyone making an effort to
inquire about conditions in El Salvador. During the 1982 elections, the
Salvadoran government accredited over 1,500 journalists— in a country
the size of Massachusetts and with a population of 5 million. The press
was everywhere, and collectively they had cultivated sources throughout
Central America, including with the FDR and FMLN (with whom they
sometimes traveled).
The candor policy meant that when the Salvadoran Armed Forces
falsely announced that they repulsed a guerrilla attack and inflicted scores
of casualties, we did not back them up. We did not go out of our way to
blab it around, but if someone asked us we would tell the truth: “Well, we
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know nothing of FMLN casualties, but the Army lost 18 killed and 34
wounded.”
The tone for this unparalleled official candor was set by
Ambassador Hinton, who made some of the least diplomatic public
statements ever by a senior American diplomat, including the following:89
Hinton: “Graduates of the Salvadoran Military Academy get a
first-rate high-school education.” (1982)
***
Joan Didion90: “Did you prevent Roberto D’Aubuisson from
becoming interim president after his ticket won a plurality in the
elections?”
Hinton: “We stopped that one on the one-yard line.” (1982)
***
NBC Producer: “When you were ambassador in Zaire, didn’t
Mobutu declare you persona non grata, expel you from Zaire?”
Hinton: “Yes.”
NBC Producer: “Didn’t he say you were planning to assassinate
him?”
Hinton: “Yes, he did.”
NBC Producer: “Well, were you?”
Hinton: “If I wanted to kill the son-of-a-bitch he would be dead!”
NBC Producer: “Is that on the record?”

89

All these statements were made in the presence of the author. In June 2013,
Ambassador Hinton confirmed his statements.
90
Writing for the New York Review of Books
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Hinton: “Damned right it is, ‘If I wanted to kill the son-of-a-bitch,
he’d be dead!’” (1982)
***
Christopher Dickey91: “Why do you spend so much time with the
press?”
Hinton: “I want to be sure our story gets told, told to everyone. Do
you know how hard it is to get a piece of paper onto the president’s
desk? He gets a press briefing before he gets his intelligence
briefing.” (1983)
Gob-smack candor became a hallmark of the entire embassy.
Formal, written mission press guidance was issued by the Public
Affairs Officer in the summer of 1983. The guidance began:
Ambassador Hinton’s policy on dealing with the press is quite
clear: Any member of the mission may speak to the press, but no
member of the mission is obliged to speak to the press.
The benefits of such a policy are manifest—a better
understanding of mission activities and policies is in the best
interest of the U.S. Government and the U.S. public.
This mission guidance contained caveats about following the
instructions of one’s supervisor, how to avoid having words put in one’s
mouth, and being careful to confine remarks to one’s own area of
knowledge or expertise. It concluded:
The vast majority of journalists with whom we deal are
responsible professionals, doing their best to report a difficult and
91

Then with The Washington Post
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confusing story at considerable personal risk. Many of these
reporters are more knowledgeable about developments in the
region than most Foreign Service personnel. We want to help
journalists and others understand what is happening here, but we
do not owe any journalist a juicy quote or a voyeur’s peek at
policy formulation.
After Ambassador Hinton left, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
was similarly candid (though less colorful in his language). Waghelstein’s
successors as MILGRP commander continued the weekly briefings and
the pattern of candor.
In time, this institutional candor paid off.
Truth was not easy to find in El Salvador. For all its improvements,
the ESAF never took onboard the idea that candid descriptions of setbacks
would help in the long run.92 The FMLN had Radio Venceremos, a
clandestine station that offered the news with classic communist
flamboyance, distortions, exaggerations, and outright lies. The human
rights office of the archdiocese was constantly ready to accept FMLN
versions over those of the Army. This led to several odd outcomes, but we
in the embassy came to know one of them very well.
In a meeting with Ambassador Pickering, Aryeh Neier, then head
of the human rights group Americas Watch, recommended that the
embassy give more weight to the numbers from the Church’s human rights
office. According to Neier, all of that Church office’s numbers were
supported by eyewitness testimony. Ambassador Pickering took Neier up
on his suggestion. The embassy human rights officer examined their

92

One commander, a lieutenant colonel, in charge of the Armed Forces Press Committee
(known by its Spanish acronym COPREFA) told the embassy PAO, who had urged more
candor: “We have lied so much for so long that if we suddenly step up and say, ‘We
suffered 32 casualties today,’ people with think it is really 3,200. We have trained them
to believe that everything is worse than we say.”
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records and found several discrepancies in their records and an interesting
example.
When the FMLN overran an important Salvadoran Army garrison
in Sensuntepeque, the Army lost several killed, wounded, and missing.
The Army was not known to have inflicted any casualties. To save face,
the ESAF announced that they had killed some 200 attackers. The
Church’s human rights office records showed that the army had murdered
some 200 unarmed civilians at that place and time—so much for
eyewitness accounts.93
In a world where no one could count on the government, the
guerrillas, or even the Church for facts, the embassy emerged as the most
reliable source of information. Skeptics and opponents of U.S. policy
knew we did not tell them all we knew. They knew we had a viewpoint,
but they could not afford to accept anyone’s assertions without checking
with us. The cumulative effort was of vast importance. It gave us two
things seldom obtained: (1) knowledge of developing stories, and (2) a
chance to tell our side of the story.
This trust had huge value over time, and it was not that hard to
obtain. We had to set aside preconceptions about the media. We had to
accept that a few reporters and news organizations were a lost cause; they
hated the policy and were out to demonstrate that it was wrong. We had to
work hard to acknowledge the flaws of our Salvadoran counterparts yet
not paint the policy goals as hopeless. The very hardest thing to do was to
avoid comment on some of the profoundly stupid things U.S. politicians of
the left and right sometimes said.

93

On the whole, the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador played a salutatory role
during the Civil War. Archbishop Romero had been confrontational, but his successor
Archbishop Rivera y Damas was less so. Although the Church’s human rights office,
Tutela Legal, was regularly manipulated by the FMLN, it was more straightforward than
its predecessor, which Archbishop Rivera y Damas abolished for its flagrant bias toward
the FMLN.
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There was another element to the media piece: All sides were
trying to turn the media to their advantage. The FMLN allowed media to
join them in their camps and sometimes on their movements. The FMLN
treated visiting journalists well, although they were severe with
unexpected visitors, fearing penetration attempts. Even then, they did not
harm them, but kept them isolated until their bona fides as journalists
could be verified.
The embassy tried to use the media, too, making every reasonable
effort to get our story told. Once again, Colonel Waghelstein tells the
story:
We wanted to highlight the work of Colonel Sigifredo
Ochoa, commander in Cabañas. He was by far the most effective
Departmental Commander at the time. His counterinsurgency
methods were worthy of cloning and included widespread civic
action, extensive civilian–military cooperation, and effective
intelligence operations. We knew the Salvadoran military followed
themselves in the U.S. press. If Ochoa came off well, his
colleagues might try to emulate him.
We got a press visit to Cabañas set up. Before they left, I
briefed them on things to look for and questions that would
demonstrate their grasp of counter-insurgency MOE. They
returned from the trip suitably impressed.
At the other end of the spectrum was the Usulután
Department Commander, who should have been replaced long ago.
We encouraged the press to go to Usulután and (if they could find
the commander sober and vertical) they could ask him the same set
of questions they had asked Colonel Ochoa. The press came
through with some embarrassing coverage and there was a change
of command in Usulután.
The worst at dealing with journalists was COPREFA (Comité de
Prensa de las Fuersas Armadas, or Press Committee of the Armed Forces).
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This official media source for the Salvadoran military was originally
staffed by a pair of alcoholic officers. The international press referred to
them as “bottle caps”—either on the bottle or on the floor. Their alcohol
problems were the least of it.
When a photo in the New York Times miscaptioned Salvadoran
soldiers as guerrillas, they called the embassy public affairs officer over to
give some advice: “What can we do about this disinformation? This makes
the guerrillas look as well-equipped as we are. How can we punish the
photographer?”
The PAO responded, “It is a mistake, not disinformation. The
photographer does not write the caption. I would let it go, but if you want
to do something, write a letter to the New York Times ridiculing them for
their error. The Times will hate that. They take themselves very seriously.”
No one wrote a letter to the Times. The next night, persons never
officially identified broke into the photographer’s apartment while he was
not at home. The intruders assaulted his Salvadoran girlfriend and trashed
the apartment.
The Salvadoran military and security forces relied almost wholly
on intimidation and, on at least one occasion, murder. It is almost certain
that the Salvadoran Army tricked four Dutch journalists into thinking they
were being led to a rendezvous with the FMLN. They were actually being
led into an “ambush” in which they were “accidentally” killed by the
Army.94 It seems likely this was intended to prevent other journalists from
attempting to travel with the FMLN.
The official version of the journalists’ death was that they had been stuck by rounds
from Army machine gun fire from a distance of at least a hundred meters—far enough
that it was not possible to determine that their cameras were not weapons and that their
appearance was nothing like that of the typical Salvadoran. In 1982, the author discussed
the matter with MILGRP officers who had seen the bodies. They said that they, who had
all seen combat in Vietnam, did not see how the Salvadoran Army’s version could be true.
The dead had been hit too many times in the torso. According to these American officers,
someone hit in the torso from a hundred meters or more usually goes down immediately
and is hardly ever hit more than twice.
94
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Most of the Salvadoran press was of little moment. There was
almost no substantive political or military coverage in Salvadoran press by
1982, and several journalists had been murdered. The last element of what
might be described as an opposition paper had been bombed out in 1980.
Salvadoran television literally carried no news programs until about 1986,
when a new station opened. The two leading papers sent no
correspondents to cover the war. Nor did the papers publish hard news
items not derived from press releases. The Miami-dwelling publisher of
the reactionary El Diario de Hoy reviewed every word of the first 12
pages via computer and modem (which was very advanced for the early
1980s). Salvadoran radio was vibrant and active, on the other hand, and
was the primary information source for most Salvadorans.
Over the years, embassy relations with the media, even those
skeptical of U.S. policy, were handled with great civility. Even when the
disagreements became pointed, voices were seldom raised.

E. Crossing Swords
Of course there were exceptions.
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, famously even-tempered and
widely regarded as the most accomplished American diplomat of his
generation,95 gave an early 1984 interview to Christian Science Monitor
Central America correspondent Dennis Volman. During the interview,
95

Pickering came to El Salvador having already served as executive secretary of the State
Department, ambassador to Nigeria, and ambassador to Jordan. He left El Salvador to
become ambassador to Israel. Later on, he was ambassador to India, to the United
Nations (during the first Gulf War), and to Russia. He ended his State Department career
as under secretary for political affairs, the number-three position in the State Department.
After retiring, he became senior vice president for international affairs for Boeing, where
he was deeply involved in multiple Boeing/Airbus issues. In 2012, he and former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen chaired the State Department’s
Accountability Review Board that examined the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher
Stevens in Benghazi, Libya.
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Volman said that the embassy’s deputy chief of mission had cavalierly
endangered the life of the Monitor’s resident correspondent, Christopher
Hedges. Ambassador Pickering said that his deputy had done nothing
more than send a clipping of a Monitor article written by Hedges. Volman
said that he believed that neither the ambassador nor the mission as a
whole had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of Salvadoran society
to understand that sending a clipping might be seen by the recipient (who
was the Salvadoran colonel commanding the National Police) as an
“signal” that Hedges should be “taken care of.”
Ambassador Pickering did not raise his voice, but interrupted
Volman to ask, “Are you speaking for the Christian Science Monitor or
for yourself?”
Long pause.
“For the Monitor,” answered Volman.
“I do not believe you. I will be in Boston96 next week and I will
make a point of seeing Charlotte Sakowski97 to verify that you are
speaking for the Monitor.”
That ended the interview.98 Volman continued as Central America
bureau chief, but never again asked a question or sought an interview with
anyone at the embassy in San Salvador.

F. Helping Out
On Saturday, March 26, 1983, Col. Waghelstein and PAO Don
Hamilton were having coffee on the back terrace of the PAO’s residence
when the phone rang.
The caller was Joan Ambrose-Newton, BBC radio correspondent
and a legal, permanent U.S. resident. The Treasury Police were at her
96

Home of the Christian Science Monitor.
Executive editor of the Monitor.
98
The author was present during the interview.
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home, arresting her and another U.S. reporter, T.J. Western. They would
not tell her why but said they were taking them to jail at Treasury Police
headquarters. No, neither of them had been hurt or roughed up. Yes, they
said they were Treasury Police, but only one showed an ID. It was
expired.
“I’m on my way,” said the PAO. The colonel and the PAO took
the PAO’s light-armored vehicle and headed for Treasury Police HQ. Both
knew the Treasury Police’s reputation.
All uniformed Salvadoran personnel—Army, Navy, Air Forces,
National Guard, Police, Treasury Police, even the fire department—were
led by graduates of the Salvadoran Military School. They sometimes
moved from service to service during the course of a career. All these
organizations (except the fire department) had a terrible reputation for
human rights abuses, but the Treasury Police had the worst reputation of
all. They were said to have “arrested” hundreds, maybe thousands, but to
hold few prisoners.
Neither Hamilton nor Waghelstein had ever been to Treasury
Police headquarters. Strictly speaking, both were veering outside the scope
of their duties by going to the Treasury Police. Protection of U.S. citizens
is the work of the consular section of the embassy. Such liaison as the
embassy maintained with law enforcement agencies was conducted either
by the Defense Attachés or (for matters relating to the protection of the
embassy) by the State Department’s Regional Security Office. Thus, the
PAO had never had occasion to visit any police headquarters, and U.S.
law forbade the MILGRP Commander to offer equipment, training, or
counsel to a law enforcement agency.99 He had never exchanged more
than pleasantries with Treasury Police officers.
They were mindful of their departure from established norms and
while en route each radioed the the Marine on Post One in the embassy
99

This prohibition originated some years before, when police organizations in several
countries had been involved in wretched human rights abuses.
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with a request that the Marine notify others. Their choice not to wait make
to the calls themselves was deliberate: They did not wait because they did
not trust the Treasury Police. Yes, the Treasury Police had acted with
unusual deference by permitting Ms. Ambrose-Newton to call an embassy
official. That was encouraging, but Salvadoran military and security
personnel had acted with brazen brutality in the past. Both men considered
it important to put official American eyes on the arrested reporters to
establish beyond doubt that both were alive and unharmed before they
went into Treasury Police cells.
Delay at Treasury Police headquarters occasioned but a phone call
from the gate. A U.S. Embassy first secretary and a colonel in the U.S.
Army (out of uniform) had come to visit two reporters who had been
arrested.
When their vehicle arrived at the main building, Treasury Police
Commander Colonel Nicolás Carranza and two other Salvadoran men
were waiting. Carranza, tall, thin, and greying, was immediately
recognizable. One of the other men wore the uniform and rank of a
Salvadoran major. The third man was in civilian clothes but had a Colt M1911 A-1 pistol, cocked and locked, stuck in the center of his belt in front.
Carranza was polite but aloof. The man in civilian clothes scowled and
made no secret of his anger at the presence of the Americans.
Col. Carranza politely but without warmth asked Colonel
Waghelstein, “What brings you to our headquarters today?”
The American colonel, mindful of the strictures under which he
operated, introduced himself and directed the question to Hamilton.
“We have come to inquire into the matter of the arrested reporters.
We want to know the charges and to meet with them to inquire as to their
treatment.”
The man in civilian clothes was not having a bit of it.
“They are detained on matters related to the internal security of El
Salvador. This is not a matter of concern to the embassy.”
Hamilton came back levelly, “Almost every nation, including the
Republic of El Salvador and the United States of America, have signed a
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treaty promising to facilitate inquiries concerning the welfare and
whereabouts of their countries’ citizens when those citizens are in the
territory of another signatory.”
He was hoping no one would raise the fact that Ms. AmbroseNewton was a South African citizen. U.S. consular access rights might not
extend to residents who are not citizens. He did not know where the
nearest South African consulate might be, but he was confident it was not
close. Nor did he believe, in those days of apartheid, that they would be
anxious to jump to the defense of a “colored” South African.
Postures and voice tones were getting stiff between Hamilton and
the man in civilian attire. Carranza stepped in, keeping his tone even.
“Why does the American embassy want to check on these people? Surely
you do not believe anything would befall them while they are with us?”
The PAO guessed that Carranza was trying to calm things without
appearing to undercut his subordinate.
“Well, my colonel,” he replied. “According to one of the reporters,
none of the men making the arrest was in uniform, and only one had
identification and it was expired. We merely wish to be certain that they
are securely in the hands of the Treasury Police. I am sure you know that
people pretending to be Treasury Police have committed lamentable acts.”
Pointed though the exchange had been, things were now calmer. In
the meantime, the Naval Attaché, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel
Phillip Ray, who was well known to the Treasury Police, and the Vice
Consul in charge of U.S. citizen services had arrived.100
Further introductions were in order and pleasantries of a sort were
exchanged. After several minutes, all the parties came to an agreement:
Ms. Ambrose-Newton was to be released to the custody of Lt. Col. Ray.
100

The attachés played an interesting role throughout. By definition, their primary duty
was to gather and report information on the host country military. And because they did
not offer military assistance, they were not banned from dealing with local law
enforcement. The Defense Attaché’s office assigned the Treasury Police to the naval
attaché, who was always a Marine.
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She would live in his house and could leave only to go to the homes or
offices of other official Americans. Mr. Western would remain in custody,
but consular officials could visit him at any time.
This situation continued for a few weeks. Eventually, Mr. Western
was released to the custody of his congressman, James Oberstar of
Wisconsin, who escorted him from the country. Cynics within the
embassy suggested that the ambassador had asked the Salvadorans to
release the prisoner to Oberstar as a means of winning his support for the
administration’s Salvador policy.101 At the same time, Ms. AmbroseNewton was released from the benign custody of the Naval Attaché and
left the country. She later returned to El Salvador, where she worked
without incident for over a year.
This small episode illustrates not just mission efforts to be friendly
and helpful to the media, but also the high degree of coordination and
cooperation within the embassy family. This kind of deliberate, thoughtful
departure from assigned lanes helped make the entire mission function
more smoothly.

G. The Guest House
The problems of Western and Ambrose-Newton were far from the
only ones faced by American reporters and news agencies. From 1982 to
the fall of 1986, the embassy public affairs officer freely offered the
protection of his diplomatic status to any journalist who sought it.102
Because his official residence, purely by coincidence, had a separate
guesthouse, this was not a significant sacrifice. The PAO guesthouse
provided temporary shelter to journalists from Newsweek, Reuters, UPI,
AP, the Guardian, and several other news organizations.
101

Ambassador Hinton denies he did this.
A 1986 earthquake made the embassy chancery uninhabitable and moved press
operations to the residence of the public affairs officer.
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H. Graciousness from a Pillar of American Socialism
On the eve of the 1985 municipal and legislative elections in El
Salvador, a group of Americans strongly opposed to U.S. support for the
(by then) constitutionally elected government got themselves accredited as
election observers, with help from the U.S. embassy. They asked the
embassy for a briefing, and Ambassador Pickering invited them to his
residence to get an informal brief from the principal team members.103
The group was emphatically not persuaded by the country team
arguments to the effect that the government was legitimate, that the
elections were honest, and that human rights abuses were down
dramatically from a few years before. Even so, the activists were mostly
polite and attentive—mostly.
As Defense Attaché Colonel L.C. “Chan” Duryea was describing
the Salvadoran military, a woman of perhaps 50 rose to her feet and began
to speak with trembling and almost tear-filled voice: “I am a New England
Quaker and I cannot believe what I am hearing here. I do not believe what
you people are saying. You are covering up for murder! And when I look
at you, Colonel, with your short hair …”
She stopped for breath.
Almost immediately, 70-year-old Bayard Rustin,104 who had
organized Martin Luther King, Jr’s. famous 1963 March on Washington,
stood and, leaning on his cane, spoke in a quiet, steady voice, “I am a New
York Quaker. In our congregation we do not disparage people. Not for the
color of their skin; not for their grooming standards. Colonel, I ask you to
believe that Quakers do not condemn anyone for their appearance.”
Rustin went on to thank the embassy staff for efforts to provide
them our view of the circumstances. His quiet dignity and gentle rebuke
103
104

The author was present at this briefing.
Rustin was African-American.
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deflated the self-righteous among his companions and effectively closed
the briefing.
Military or civilian personnel assigned to execute controversial
policy should expect at least verbal abuse and negative stereotyping from
those opposing the policy. On the bright side, even those clearly on the
other side of the issue can be gracious.
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IX. Leverage? What Leverage?
By 1984, the U.S. was giving the Salvadoran government $1.5
million daily, two-thirds as economic assistance; the rest was military.
That should have given the embassy enormous leverage. It
sometimes seemed to. Salvadoran politicians and military personnel would
devote endless hours talking to U.S. congressmen, administration officials,
and so on. They would offer flawless talking points fine-tuned to resonate
in American ears. The military renounced any claim to direct political
power.
But there was one thing the Salvadoran military would not give
up—their impunity from criminal prosecution. Scores of thousands of
people were killed through El Salvador’s civil war. Most of them were
murdered—not killed in combat, but murdered. Although the FMLN and
its predecessors did plenty of killing outside combat, there is no real doubt
that military and other security forces were responsible for an
overwhelming majority of the murders.
Even with constant pressure from the United States to hold
individuals accountable for their criminal acts, those who sought judicial
process and punishment were terribly disappointed by the results. Even in
the highest-profile murders, justice could not be wrung from the officer
corps, as the following examples show:

Charges were never brought in the murders of the FDR
(democratic socialist) leaders.

The murder of the American nuns brought jail for the junior
enlisted men involved. These men were pardoned in the general amnesty
of 1993. In spite of profound suspicions that the enlisted men would not
have done this on their own, no one up the chain was ever seriously
investigated.
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There was never a Salvadoran investigation into the murder
of American journalist John Sullivan. One legislator from the far-right
ARENA party tried to prevent a forensic examination of the remains.

The Sheraton case, where many details are known, may be
the most frustrating:
o The Salvadoran Supreme Court justice who appointed the
investigating magistrate was the uncle of one of the prime
suspects, Captain Ernesto Ávila.
o Lt. López Sibrián went for a lineup in full dress uniform
with his hat on, his very distinctive bright red hair dyed
black, and his mustache shaved off. He had not been in
uniform the night of the murders.
o Sheraton Hotel owner Ricardo Sol Mesa told hotel staff
members they might “end up under the hotel” if they
testified.
o Hans Christ, who fingered the victims, was arrested but
released for lack of evidence.
o Major Denis Morán, who was with all the other suspects
except the triggermen, was never charged.
o The two triggermen were jailed until released by a general
amnesty in 1993.
o Lt. López Sibrián was never held accountable for the
Sheraton murders. The military did permit the criminal
justice system to jail him for several years for participating
in a kidnapping-for-profit ring. That group, pretending to
be FMLN guerrillas, kidnapped wealthy and powerful
Salvadorans. The wealth and power of the Salvadoran
victims may have brought him down. U.S. power, leverage,
and influence certainly did not.

Only two people, Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides
and Lieutenant Yuhssy René Mendoza, were convicted for the Jesuit
murders. They were released in the 1993 amnesty after serving two years.
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Over the course of more than a decade, hundreds of military and
diplomatic officers attempted to bring justice and democracy to El
Salvador.
They succeeded in bringing democracy.
But when the war ended, the Salvadoran officer corps had
maintained their solidarity and their impunity to punishment. That
solidarity in the face of so much pressure is perversely impressive. With
the military and security forces responsible for thousands of murders,
perhaps a dozen enlisted men and a handful of officers were imprisoned—
none for more than 12 years.
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X. Final Issues for Discussion
These are the personal thoughts and cautions of the author, who
makes no claim of omniscience.
Did the United States “win” in El Salvador?
We aligned with a flawed, beleaguered government and prevented
a takeover by forces hostile to the United States. For the first time since
the 1950s,105 we confronted armed forces supported by communists from
around the world and denied them a victory. We said we wanted honest
elections with participation by all parties, and honest elections took place.
For the past 30 years, electoral results have been honored by all parties.
Thus, we can fairly be said to have done our part to help bring
about democracy in a country that had never seen it. That must count as a
victory.
But it is a victory with an asterisk. Could we have gone the
distance had the Soviet Union not collapsed? There is certainly reason to
raise the question. Few of the injustices that drove the insurgency were
ended. The military’s impunity was merely scratched.
To this day, millions of people in the United States and around the
world equate our involvement in El Salvador as a blot on our national
copybook. The misdeeds of the Salvadoran military are well known and
documented.
The FMLN got away more or less clean. The U.S. government
carefully documented and demonstrated that the FMLN was getting its M16s from Vietnam and not capturing them from the Salvadoran military, as
the FMLN claimed. When getting ammunition for M-16s became too hard,
the FMLN switched to AK-47s, which the Salvadoran military never had
from any source. Even so, any search on Google of the subject of arms
smuggling turns up a nearly solid wall of articles all but denying
communist arms supplies. No one mentions that the FMLN press-ganged
105
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young teens to fill the ranks. No one remembers that the FMLN celebrated
the deaths of the “war criminals” aboard the space shuttle Challenger106 or,
in at least one little-known case, that the FMLN murdered Salvadoran
soldiers after they had surrendered.107 At the rate things are going,
everyone will “know” that the U.S. created and trained the death squads
we tried so hard to get rid of.
What can we take from the experience in El Salvador and put to
use?

When any president repeatedly insists that a particular
government must not “fall” because major U.S. national security
interests are involved, he casts away leverage. The Salvadoran military
knew that we would not walk away after we linked their success to our
security. All the arguments that put us into Iraq and Afghanistan might be
keeping us there with more personnel for longer than we would otherwise
stay. The U.S. no longer seeks combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, but how
many troops remain? How long will they stay there?

Once we commit to one side, many will hold us
responsible for all that side does. From murders in El Salvador to opium
in Afghanistan, we own it all.

Money and arms do not buy loyalty. They rent lip
service. Consider Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt.
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The author well recalls that Radio Venceremos, the official voice of the FMLN, on the
morning after the Challenger blew up on launch, described the entire crew as war
criminals.
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In 1983, an officer from MILGRP photographed the bodies of several Salvadoran
soldiers. When I personally showed the 8×10 photos to a physician from Amnesty
International, he told me it was clear that they had all been murdered after they had taken
off their uniforms. He told me it was easy to determine this because the blood trails on
their bodies showed they were not clothed (all were wearing underwear). He noted that
almost all were dead from high-velocity rifle wounds to the head and that the severity of
the wounds indicated they had been shot from no more than a few feet. We displayed
these photos to the U.S. press, and no one doubted they had been murdered. Even so, a
two-hour Internet search in 2014 found no record of this event.
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When people complain about human rights abuses, we
should listen carefully. This does not mean that we should blacklist
countries willy-nilly, but we need to pay attention. The Reagan
administration spent millions of dollars and wasted significant prestige in
El Salvador before recognizing that right-wing violence was feeding the
insurgency.

We tend to believe people who parrot our talking
points—especially if they speak English. President Karzai speaks
beautiful English and 10 years ago spoke glowingly of democracy. Ahmed
Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who had spent most of his life in London and the
U.S., was a strong advocate for U.S. intervention. He proved very
persuasive in Washington before the war in Iraq started and during the
occupation. Iraqis give him significant recognition, but almost no support.

T. E. Lawrence was right about eating soup with a knife.
It is sloppy when you force host country personnel to undertake difficult
and unfamiliar tasks, but worth it. Such success as we achieved in El
Salvador came about because the political situation in the U.S. would not
permit us to send hundreds or even thousands of trainers and advisers.

Treat training a foreign army with skepticism. How
much training does an army need? We recruited, trained, equipped,
deployed, and demobilized roughly 10 million men and women between
1939 and 1945. We have been training Iraqi and Afghan soldiers longer
than that.

Most importantly, understand that you are unlikely to
find a fair, just, and benevolent government beset by an insurgency.
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